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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 On August 20, 2007, billionaire hotelier Leona Helmsley died, 
survived by her brother, four grandchildren, twelve great-grandchildren,
1
 
and her beloved companion of eight years, a white Maltese dog named 
Trouble.
2
 One week later came news that shocked the world. Helmsley left 
$12 million to Trouble.
3
 
 Across the globe, reporters, readers, lawyers, and law professors alike 
greeted the news with outrage and derision. Critics called the legacy 
―obscene,‖4 ―ridiculous,‖5 and, as lawyer Mickey Sherman put it, ―an 
amazing waste of money.‖6 In a letter to the editor of her local newspaper, 
a Rochester woman expressed her disgust at Helmsley‘s decision, noting 
that the $12 million ―could have provided 100 homeless families a house 
or 100 deserving kids a college education[,] . . . fed a small nation or 
served thousands of neglected children.‖7 A University of Texas columnist 
reminded her readers that dogs are ―notoriously bad money managers [and] 
. . . lack the opposable thumbs necessary to use a calculator or the 
computer skills to do their banking online.‖8  
 However, Helmsley‘s long-time rival, Donald Trump, provided a very 
different perspective. On hearing the news of Trouble‘s $12 million 
inheritance, he released the following statement: ‗―The dog is the only 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Dennis McLellan, Obituaries: Leona Helmsley, 87, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at B8.  
 2. Trouble turned out to be aptly named. She had a penchant for biting Helmsley‘s 
employees and customers and once even bit ―a diner in a top New York restaurant.‖ Jane Fryer, Her 
Name‟s Trouble and, with £6m in the Bank, She‟s the World‟s Richest Dog, DAILY MAIL (London), 
Dec. 6, 2007, at 61.  
 3. Leona Helmsley did not leave the $12 million outright to Trouble. Instead, she ―left $12 
million in her will to an inter vivos pet trust that she created pursuant to the New York pet trust 
statute.‖ Frances Carlisle, Helmsley Pet Trust Raises Issues for Owners of All Income Levels, 241 
N.Y. L.J. 4 (2009); see also Last Will and Testament of Leona M. Helmsley art. 1F (July 15, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/city_room/20070829_helmsleywill.pdf 
(leaving $12 million to the trustees of the Leona Helmsley July 2005 Trust). In 2008, Manhattan 
Surrogate Judge Renee Roth reduced Trouble‘s trust fund to $2 million. Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch: 
The Legal Battle Over Trust Funds for Pets, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 38. 
 4. Stevie Lacy-Pendleton, The Pampered Furry and Human Need, STATEN ISLAND 
ADVANCE, Aug. 31, 2007, at A22. 
 5. Barbara Gelinas, Doggone Waste: Dogs are Bad with Money, SHORTHORN, Sept. 12, 
2007, at 5.  
 6. Leona Helmsley Leaves Dog $12 Million (CBS television broadcast Sept. 27, 2008) 
(quoting Mickey Sherman) (transcript on file with author). 
 7. Jessica Shanahan, Letter to the Editor, Dog‟s Inheritance Symbolized Legacy, ROCHESTER 
DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Sept. 7, 2007, at 11A.  
 8. Gelinas, supra note 5. 
2
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thing that loved her and deserves every single penny of it.‖‘9 Helmsley‘s 
former housekeeper, Zamfira Sfara, was also not shocked by Trouble‘s 
good fortune.
10
 Indeed, she reported that the bond between Helmsley and 
Trouble was so close
11
 that when Helmsley left her hotel penthouse, ―[t]he 
dog would stay by the door, lying on the floor for three hours, waiting for 
her to come. It never moved.‖12 
 This Article argues that Trouble—and the millions13 of American 
pets
14
 like her
15—should inherit. For many Americans today, their pets, not 
their human family members, are their nearest and dearest. 
 In earlier work,
16
 I have argued that American inheritance law is 
trapped in an outdated family paradigm. That paradigm assumes that the 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Editorial, Where There‟s a Will, There‟s a Way to Stay „Queen of Mean,‟ CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 2007, at 43 (quoting Donald Trump). 
 10. Kerry Burke & Jose Martinez, Nothing But Trouble, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 30, 2007, 
at 7 (stating that Sfara was not surprised to hear Helmsley left $12 million to Trouble). Like Trump, 
Sfara observed: ―Leona wanted everybody to love her, but she knew nobody loved her . . . . This 
dog replaced that love.‖ Id. 
 11. This is not to say that Sfara approved of the relationship between Helmsley and Trouble. 
In fact, she described that relationship as ―unnatural.‖ Id. 
 12. Manny Fernandez, A Newly Minted Multimillionaire Can‟t Buy Herself a Friend, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at B3. 
 13. Press Release, Am. Pet Prods. Ass‘n, New Survey Reveals that When It Comes to Caring 
for Our Faithful Companions, American Pet Owners are Top Dog (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.media.americanpetproducts.org (―[T]here are 77.5 million dogs, 93.6 million cats, 171.7 
million freshwater fish, 11.2 million saltwater fish, 15 million birds, 15.9 million small animals, 
13.63 million reptiles and 13.3 million horses owned in the U.S.‖ (citing statistics in the American 
Pet Products Association‘s 2009–2010 National Pet Owners Survey)). Inheritance by pets is by no 
means solely a U.S. phenomenon. For example, the United Kingdom‘s largest pet insurance 
provider, Petplan, published the 2009 Pet Rich List, which included wealthy pets from Australia, 
Canada, England, Germany, and South Africa. See Marie Kierans, Editorial, For Richer for Paw-er, 
MIRROR (London), Aug. 15, 2009, at 10 (listing the twenty wealthiest pets on Petplan‘s 2009 Pet 
Rich List); Fat Cats; The Rich, the Cute and the Furry, PETPLAN (Aug. 12, 2009), 
http://www.petplan.co.uk/contactus/press/affluent_pets.asp (identifying the forty-seven wealthiest 
pets on the list). 
 14. Many authors prefer the terms ―companion animals‖ and ―human guardians‖ to ―pets‖ and 
―owners‖ on grounds that the latter terms ―wrongfully connote property values, rather than 
suggesting the close bond of companionship and love that can be shared between human animals 
and those animals of a different species.‖ Vasiliki Agorianitis, Comment, Being Daphne‟s Mom: An 
Argument for Valuing Companion Animals as Companions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1453, 1454 
n.2 (2006). Although I am sympathetic to these concerns, I have continued to employ the terms 
―pets‖ and ―owners‖ in this Article because of their widespread usage and familiarity to most 
readers. In fact, even the Humane Society, which ―preferred ‗companion animal‘ until 
recently, . . . bowed to popular usage and returned to ‗pet.‘‖ KATHERINE C. GRIER, PETS IN AMERICA: 
A HISTORY 7 (2006). 
 15. This is not meant to suggest that there is another pet anywhere who shares Trouble‘s 
unique—for better or worse—personality and life story. Rather, this refers to a pet, like Trouble, 
with whom the decedent had a close bond.  
 16. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199 (2001) 
[hereinafter Foster, Family Paradigm]; Frances H. Foster, Individualized Justice in Disputes over 
Dead Bodies, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1351 (2008) [hereinafter Foster, Individualized Justice]. 
3
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decedent‘s closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage are the most 
deserving recipients of the decedent‘s estate, the so-called ‗―natural objects 
of the decedent‘s bounty.‘‖17 Using a humanistic approach, I have shown 
that this abstract vision of ―natural‖ wealth distribution permeates law and 
decisionmaking and creates significant human costs.
18
 By ignoring the 
actual relationships between decedents and survivors, the family paradigm 
excludes the very people a particular decedent may have valued most—
those connected by affection and support rather than by family status.
19
 
This Article extends my critique. It argues that the family paradigm also 
fails to recognize survivors many Americans regard as their closest 
companions, friends, and even family—their pets. 
 Part II presents my critique of the family paradigm. It shows how that 
paradigm excludes decedents‘ nonhuman as well as human loved ones. 
The result is an inheritance system that defeats decedents‘ wishes and 
leaves their most beloved companions unprotected. 
 Part III turns to recent reform strategies. It analyzes those strategies as 
pursuing three main goals: (1) enforcing pet care arrangements on an ad 
hoc basis; (2) improving legal mechanisms to provide for decedents‘ pets; 
and (3) redefining the legal status of pets. Part III concludes that these 
strategies offer only partial solutions because they fail to challenge the 
family paradigm. 
 Part IV offers a new approach. It attacks the very foundation of 
American inheritance law—the narrow status-based definition of ―natural 
objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖ Drawing on recent studies, this Part 
demonstrates that many Americans are now as close or closer to their pets 
than their human family members. Part IV then considers possible new 
directions for an inheritance system that regards inheritance by pets as 
―natural.‖ Part V concludes that reformers must look beyond the family 
paradigm‘s abstractions and develop more individualized approaches that 
encompass a decedent‘s actual natural objects―be they human or 
nonhuman. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1357 (quoting Mundy v. Simmons, 424 
A.2d 135, 139 (Me. 1980)); see also Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 205–21. 
 18. See, e.g., Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240–51 (setting out the human costs 
of the family paradigm). I have also used this approach to identify the human costs of trust privacy. 
Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 559, 584–612 (2008). 
 19. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 245 (stating that the family paradigm 
excludes ―caring relationships with extended family members, nonmarital partners, close friends, 
and nonrelated caregivers‖); see also Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New 
Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1239–40, 1257 (arguing that the U.S. inheritance 
system fails to recognize survivors who provided the decedent support because ―[u]nder inflexible 
status-based intestacy rules, contributions to the decedent‘s welfare are irrelevant for inheritance 
purposes‖). 
4
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II.  PETS UNDER THE FAMILY PARADIGM OF INHERITANCE LAW: 
COMPANIONS DURING LIFE, PROPERTY AT DEATH 
A.  The Family Paradigm‟s Narrow Definition of “Natural Objects of a 
Decedent‟s Bounty” 
 American inheritance law is entrenched in a family paradigm that 
exalts family status over affection, support, and behavior.
20
 If a decedent 
dies without a will, the rigid status-based rules of intestacy apply.
21
 The 
decedent‘s closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage automatically 
inherit.
22
 They are, by definition, the ―natural objects of the decedent‘s 
bounty.‖23 Survivors‘ actual relationships with the decedent are 
irrelevant.
24
 The daughter who abandoned her father inherits.
25
 The partner, 
sister, or friend who shared his life does not.
26
 
                                                                                                                     
 20. For extended discussion, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 205–22. In 
earlier comparative law work, I focused specifically on the American inheritance system‘s failure to 
factor in behavior and support. Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of 
Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 79–81, 84 (1998) (arguing that 
the American status-based model disregards heirs‘ actual behavior—good and bad—toward the 
decedent); Foster, supra note 19, at 1217–54 (arguing that U.S. inheritance law fails to recognize 
survivors‘ support needs and contributions). 
 21. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES 
AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 13 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (referring to inheritance rules as a 
―rigid scheme‖); Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be 
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 259–60, 291–98 (1994) (criticizing the ―status-based‖ approach 
of current intestacy law and proposing a ―behavior-based model of inheritance‖). 
 22. For a summary of common patterns of American intestacy statutes, see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 2 (1999); see also JEFFREY A. 
SCHOENBLUM, 2009 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING tbl.8 (2008) (summarizing the 
intestacy laws of all states). 
 23. Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 139 (Me. 1980) (defining ―the surviving spouse and 
those who stand in closest relationship within the blood line as the natural objects of the decedent‘s 
bounty‖); see also Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate 
Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 418 (1997) 
(―‗[N]atural objects of decedent‘s bounty‘ . . . . [have been] long considered to be persons related 
by blood, marriage, or adoption.‖). 
 24. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1360 (―[B]y focusing on survivors‘ 
family status alone, current rules assume that the decedent‘s ‗closest‘ relatives are entitled to inherit 
and ignore those individuals‘ actual behavior toward the decedent, no matter how reprehensible.‖). 
This disregard for actual relationships between decedents and survivors is by no means limited to 
the intestacy context. See Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 988 
(1999) (―The law of wills focuses upon the familial status of the beneficiary rather than upon the 
quality of the beneficiary‘s relationship to the decedent.‖).  
 25. For examples of cases where children abandoned or physically, emotionally, and 
financially abused their parents and still were able to inherit from their parents, see Foster, Family 
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240; Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights: 
California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build an Effective 
Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 537–42 (2001).  
 26. For a discussion of such cases, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240–43, 
245–48. ―For those excluded from the family paradigm, the effects can be emotionally as well as 
financially devastating. . . . Survivors find themselves ‗treat[ed] . . . as if they were strangers‘ to the 
5
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 Efforts to bypass the family paradigm by will, trust, or contract also fall 
victim to the paradigm‘s narrow status-based definition of natural 
objects.
27
 Indeed, inheritance law‘s bias in favor of the traditional family is 
so strong that dispositions to those outside the immediate family circle are 
considered ―unnatural.‖28 
 Trusts and estates scholars have presented a devastating critique of the 
family paradigm. They have demonstrated that this paradigm transmits a 
―culture through property‖29 that is alien and harmful30 to many Americans. 
Scholars have shown that by privileging membership in the ―traditional‖ 
family, American inheritance law systematically discriminates on the basis 
of race,
31
 ethnicity,
32
 gender,
33
 class,
34
 and sexuality.
35
 This discrimination 
is so pervasive that it can even render the so-called ―organizing principle‖36 
of American inheritance law—freedom of disposition—a ―myth.‖37 As 
                                                                                                                     
individuals with whom they shared years of affection, intimacy, and companionship.‖ Id. at 248 
(quoting Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 
LAW & INEQ. 1, 89 (1998)). 
 27. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 209–19 (discussing the family paradigm‘s 
impact on wills, will substitutes, and contracts to devise). 
 28. In re Estate of Gersbach, 960 P.2d 811, 817 (N.M. 1998) (―We must conclude the gift to 
Warren is ‗unnatural‘ because he would not inherit under the laws of intestacy and that the prior gift 
to Mrs. Gerbach was ‗natural‘ because she would have been an intestate heir.‖).  
 29. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 11 (2d ed. 1997). 
 30. For a discussion of the human costs of the family paradigm, see Foster, Family Paradigm, 
supra note 16, at 240–51; see also Elvia R Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. 
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691, 694 (1997) (criticizing the view that ―love and feelings in some 
relationships just do not matter because the resident status, or sexual status, or human rights status 
of these relationships is not traditional or legal‖).  
 31. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum 
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999) (documenting the role of private law in perpetuating 
traditional racial hierarchies); Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62 SMU 
L. REV. 1783 (2009) (examining racial bias in the context of testamentary transfers). 
 32. See, e.g., Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 245–48. 
 33. See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and 
Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 63–68 (2009); Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and 
Trusts: “The Kingdom of the Fathers,” 10 LAW & INEQ. 137 (1991) (maintaining that wills and 
trusts law has been historically, and continues to be, skewed in favor of men). For a comparative 
law empirical study, see Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food 
for Legal Thought, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 322 (2010).  
 34. See, e.g., DiRusso, supra note 33, at 76–77; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the 
Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 377. 
 35. For a sampling of the extensive literature on discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
and transgender individuals, see A. Spencer Bergstedt, Estate Planning and the Transgender Client, 
30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 675 (2008); Fellows et al., supra note 26; Amy D. Ronner, Homophobia: 
In the Closet and in the Coffin, 21 LAW & INEQ. 65 (2003).  
 36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a 
(2001). 
 37. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235–36, 
273 (1996); see also Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576 
(1997) (arguing that the ―undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who 
6
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Professor Kevin Maillard concluded from his study of interracial will 
contests, ―Testamentary freedom, in all of its aspirational claims, means 
nothing in the face of a legal system rooted in the restrictive and damaging 
conformity of ‗legitimate‘ families.‖38 
 In a vast and ever-growing literature, trusts and estates scholars have 
exposed the family paradigm as outdated, underinclusive,
39
 and 
discriminatory. They have shown that the family the paradigm celebrates 
and rewards――a legally married husband and wife, and the children of that 
marriage‖40―is rapidly disappearing. Scholars have made a compelling 
case that, as more and more Americans find affection and support outside 
the nuclear family, the family paradigm excludes those who should inherit: 
the survivors whose lives had been ―most intimately intertwined with the 
decedent‘s.‖41 The family paradigm declares ―unnatural‖ the very 
relationships many Americans now regard as ―natural.‖ 
 Established scholars and new voices in the field have identified a 
lengthy list of decedents‘ loved ones the family paradigm excludes. For 
example, Professors Mary Louise Fellows,
42
 Thomas Gallanis,
43
 and Gary 
Spitko
44
 have shown that the traditional definition of ―spouse‖ excludes 
those who cannot or choose not to marry: unmarried same-sex and 
opposite-sex cohabitants. Several authors have emphasized the particular 
challenges the traditional definition poses for transsexual spouses and 
partners.
45
 
 Numerous scholars have demonstrated that the definition of ―child‖ is 
                                                                                                                     
deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms—in particular, the norm that people should 
provide for their families‖); Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence 
Should Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 246 (2010) (―Rather than protecting testamentary 
freedom, [the undue influence doctrine] is a means to keep inheritance within families, or at least 
within relationships fitting preconceived social norms.‖). 
 38. Maillard, supra note 31, at 1816. 
 39. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 41 
(2000) (―The definition may be underinclusive because it excludes many currently existing family 
groups . . . .‖); Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The 
Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 254–55 n.202 
(2008) (―Particularly vulnerable to this underinclusiveness are those families who do not conform to 
the ‗traditional‘ family model.‖). For a comprehensive analysis of how inheritance law fails to 
―reflect modern American famil[y]‖ life, see generally RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND 
THE EVOLVING FAMILY 7 (2004).  
 40. Gary, supra note 39, at 28. 
 41. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 242. 
 42. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 26. 
 43. See, e.g., T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex 
Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513 (1999); T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 
TUL. L. REV. 55 (2004). 
 44. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance 
Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255 (2002); E. Gary Spitko, The 
Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1063 (1999). 
 45. See, e.g., Bergstedt, supra note 35; Melissa Aubin, Comment, Defying Classification: 
Intestacy Issues for Transsexual Surviving Spouses, 82 OR. L. REV. 1155 (2003). 
7
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equally problematic.
46
 Here, too, inheritance law fails to encompass 
survivors outside the traditional nuclear family unit, such as nonmarital 
children,
47
 equitably adopted children,
48
 adult adoptees,
49
 and nonrelated 
individuals in a child-parent relationship with the decedent.
50
 Other authors 
have called attention to another source of exclusion―inheritance law‘s 
failure to update its definitions of ―child‖ and ―parent‖ to reflect advances 
in reproductive technology
51
 and paternity testing.
52
 Thus, as Professors 
Browne Lewis,
53
 Paula Monopoli,
54
 and Lee-ford Tritt
55
 have recently 
                                                                                                                     
 46. As Professor Ralph Brashier has observed, an ―increasingly notable shortcoming[] of 
modern probate law is its failure to provide adequate guidelines governing the inheritance rights of 
children outside the traditional nuclear family.‖ Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the 
Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 94. For an outstanding, comprehensive critique of 
the default rules of intestacy law, especially those of the Uniform Probate Code, regarding the 
parent-child relationship, see Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing 
Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273 (2010). 
 47. See, e.g., Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of Marital 
and Non-Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: 
Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011); Paula 
A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance 
Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857 (2008).  
 48. See, e.g., Higdon, supra note 39 (tracing the history of the equitable adoption doctrine 
and proposing steps to cure the doctrine‘s shortcomings); Irene D. Johnson, A Suggested Solution to 
the Problem of Intestate Succession in Nontraditional Family Arrangements: Taking the 
“Adoption” (and the Inequity) Out of the Doctrine of “Equitable Adoption,” 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
271 (2009). 
 49. See, e.g., Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia‟s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence 
Protect Adults Who Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution?, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 95 (2009); Peter T. Wendel, The Succession Rights of Adopted Adults: Trying to 
Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815 (2010) (proposing inheritance 
schemes in different adult adoption contexts). 
 50. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 643 (2002) (examining intestacy system shortcomings in the context of nonrelated 
individuals). 
 51. For a sampling of the extensive literature on the impact of reproductive technology on 
inheritance rights, see Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem 
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967 (1996); Kristine S. 
Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception, and Intestacy, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 627 
(2005); Raymond C. O‘Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 332 (2009). 
 52. See, e.g., Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Posthumous Paternity Testing: A Proposal to Amend 
EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2)(D), 69 ALB. L. REV. 947 (2006); Gregory Todd Jones,  Disinterment and DNA 
Testing: Providing for Court Orders for Disinterment and DNA Testing in Certain Cases Where the 
Kinship of Any Party in Interest to a Decedent is in Controversy, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 347 (2002). 
 53. Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath 
Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403 (2009) (discussing the impact of reproductive technology); 
Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men 
Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949 (2009) (same). 
 54. See Monopoli, supra note 47, at 859 (discussing the impact of ―scientific advances in 
paternity testing‖). 
 55. Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to 
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underscored, these definitions are becoming obsolete in a world where a 
child can be conceived posthumously,
56
 have her parentage determined by 
DNA testing of her father‘s corpse,57 or if born in a surrogacy arrangement, 
potentially claim any of eight individuals as a parent.
58
 
 Scholars have demonstrated that the definitional problems go beyond 
the family paradigm‘s preferential categories of spouse, child, and parent. 
They have shown that the paradigm‘s narrow concept of family disregards 
the changing nature of the American family, in which blended,
59
 
committed,
60
 and extended
61
 family members may well be a decedent‘s 
―natural objects.‖ Professor Kristine Knaplund, for example, has criticized 
inheritance law for failing to recognize the central role many grandparents 
now play in raising their children‘s children.62 A few scholars have looked 
outside the family altogether and identified nonrelated individuals whom 
the family paradigm excludes. For example, Professors John Gaubatz,
63
 
Laura Rosenbury,
64
 and I
65
 have criticized inheritance law‘s status-based 
                                                                                                                     
Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 367 (2009) (discussing reproductive 
technology and inheritance rights). 
 56. For an example of a case involving inheritance rights of a posthumously conceived child, 
see In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 2007). 
 57. For an example of a case in which a body was exhumed to determine a child‘s paternity 
through DNA testing, see In re Estate of Michael Dennis Tytanic, 61 P.3d 249 (Okla. 2002). 
 58. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602 (2002) (―The fragmentation of 
parentage by assisted reproduction creates the possibility that a child conceived by this means could 
have as many as eight parents: the egg donor, the sperm donor, their spouses, the surrogate and her 
husband, and the intending mother and father.‖). 
 59. See, e.g., Ralph C. Brashier, Consanguinity, Sibling Relationships, and the Default Rules 
of Inheritance Law: Reshaping Half-blood Statutes to Reflect the Evolving Family, 58 SMU L. REV. 
137 (2005); Andrew L. Noble, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in Pennsylvania: A Proposal 
for Reform, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 835 (2003); Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner 
Adoption Paradigm: Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 351 (2005). 
 60. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 26; Jennifer Seidman, Comment, Functional Families 
and Dysfunctional Laws: Committed Partners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV 211 
(2004); Carissa R. Trast, Note, You Can‟t Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex 
Couples Are Entitled to Inheritance Rights from Both Their Parents, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 857 
(2006). 
 61. See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the 
Implications for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2006); Neta Sazonov, Note, Expanding the 
Statutory Definition of “Child” in Intestacy Law: A Just Solution for the Inheritance Difficulties 
Grandparent Caregivers‟ Grandchildren Currently Face, 17 ELDER L.J. 401 (2010). For a 
discussion of how exclusion of extended family members is ethnically biased, see Foster, Family 
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 245–46. 
 62. Knaplund, supra note 61. 
 63. John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 559 
(1977) (stating that a ―decedent‘s close family might include nonblood relatives and friends‖). 
 64. Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 204–05 (2007) (―Even 
if friends are performing many, or all, of the functions traditionally ascribed to spouses, parents, or 
children, friends are not eligible . . . to inherit each other‘s estates under state intestacy rules.‖). 
 65. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1359 (―[B]y privileging the traditional 
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rules for ignoring the claims of nonrelated caregivers, friends, and others 
who were a decedent‘s principal source of affection and support. 
 In sum, trusts and estates scholars have presented an extensive and 
persuasive critique of the family paradigm. They have shown that the 
paradigm increasingly denies inheritance rights to the very individuals 
decedents regarded as their nearest and dearest. These scholars have failed 
to appreciate, however, the full range of survivors the family paradigm 
ignores. As the next section will show, the family paradigm excludes the 
decedent‘s nonhuman as well as human loved ones. 
B.  Extension to Pets 
 In his 2000 will, Timothy Kirk Saueressig repeatedly instructed his 
beneficiaries to take care of his four cats.
66
 He wrote: ―They are my 
family!!‖67 Saueressig is not alone. An estimated 80% of Americans regard 
their pets as members of their family.
68
 Yet, under the family paradigm of 
inheritance law, pets do not count as family. 
 If the decedent dies without a will, even her closest nonhuman 
companions and family members do not qualify as heirs. The nephew who 
has not seen his aunt for twenty years inherits her property.
69
 The Angora 
cat who gave an elderly woman ―‗a reason to keep living‘‖70 is her 
property. Statutory family support mechanisms too do not apply to a 
decedent‘s pets.71 Pets are left unprotected, their fate determined by the 
decedent‘s human survivors. And that fate can be precarious indeed. For 
example, an elderly New York woman died, survived by her adult 
grandchildren and two ―cherished parakeets.‖72 Unfortunately, she left no 
instructions regarding the care of her birds. Instead, she trusted her 
survivors to do what they ―thought best.‖73 The grandchildren‘s solution 
                                                                                                                     
family, inheritance law ignores the claims of survivors the decedent may have valued most: her 
close friends, caregivers, and other nonrelatives with whom she shared an ‗affection-support‘ 
relationship.‖); Foster, supra note 19, at 1239–40 (arguing that status-based rules exclude 
caregivers). For an extended discussion of how wills law and intestate succession should recognize 
the contributions of family and nonrelated caregivers to a decedent‘s welfare, see Joshua C. Tate, 
Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129 (2008). 
 66. In re Estate of Saueressig, 136 P.3d 201, 209 n.11 (Cal. 2006). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property 
Classification of Companion Animals by Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 482 (2003) (―[M]ore 
than 80% of companion animal guardians consider their companion animals as family members.‖). 
 69. See, e.g., Waldecker v. Pfefferle, No. E-02-002, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6016, at *10 (Ct. 
App. Nov. 8, 2002) (reporting that one of the decedent‘s heirs ―stated that he had not seen his aunt 
for 20 years‖).  
 70. Ranny Green, Tinker the Cat‟s in the Cream, OREGONIAN, Dec. 29, 1993, at F2 (quoting 
Ann Morgan‘s friend, Ruth Ward, about Morgan‘s relationship with her Angora cat, Tinker). 
 71. For a critical summary of statutory support mechanisms for a decedent‘s closest surviving 
family members, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 219–21. 
 72. DAVID CONGALTON & CHARLOTTE ALEXANDER, WHEN YOUR PET OUTLIVES YOU: 
PROTECTING ANIMAL COMPANIONS AFTER YOU DIE 2 (2002) (reporting this case). 
 73. Id. 
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was to bring the parakeets to the funeral home visitation for their 
grandmother, wring the birds‘ necks, and put the bodies in the 
grandmother‘s casket. 
 Luckily, many Americans are not so trusting. They have the foresight 
to make advance arrangements for the care of their pets. According to 
recent studies, 27% of American pet owners who have wills include their 
pets in their wills.
74
 A 2009 survey revealed that one-third of dog, cat, and 
bird owners and one-half of horse owners specify in their wills a 
caretaker/guardian for their pet.
75
 Published reports confirm that 
Americans use wills to express their love and concern for their nonhuman 
survivors. For example, in a joint will, a Colorado couple provided for the 
―faithful and loving care of our dog ‗Peggy‘ a Boston Bull, for the devotion 
and affectionate companionship she gave to us during our lives.‖76 A New 
York brokerage-house manager‘s will left one-fourth of her estate in trust 
for her cats and stated: ―‗The welfare of my pets is paramount.‖77  
 For over a century, U.S. courts have confronted both testamentary and 
nontestamentary schemes
78
 to provide for a wide variety of animals, 
including dogs, cats, parrots, horses, burros, and chimpanzees.
79
 Courts 
have acknowledged that a decedent‘s pets may be her closest friends, 
companions, and even ―sole immediate family.‖80 Yet, as this section will 
show, courts have often
81
 frustrated decedents‘ efforts to ensure care for 
                                                                                                                     
 74. BARRY SELTZER & GERRY W. BEYER, FAT CATS & LUCKY DOGS: HOW TO LEAVE (SOME 
OF) YOUR ESTATE TO YOUR PET 54 (2010).  
 75. Press Release, Am. Pet Prods. Ass‘n, supra note 13 (reproducing the American Pet 
Products Manufacturers Association‘s news release summarizing the results of its 2009–2010 
National Pet Owners Survey). 
 76. Ireland v. Jacobs, 163 P.2d 203, 204 (Colo. 1945) (reproducing Frederick J. Leibold‘s 
and Bertha M. Leibold‘s joint will). 
 77. Frank Donnelly, Caring for Pets After You‟re Dead, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Aug. 31, 
2008, at A1 (quoting Susan M. Ryder‘s will).  
 78. For an outstanding in-depth analysis of English and American courts‘ treatment of legal 
mechanisms for the care of decedents‘ pets, see Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When 
Their Humans Die?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 617, 621–49 (2000); see also James T. Brennan, 
Bequests for the Care of Specific Animals, 6 DUQ. L. REV. 15, 22–39 (1967); Christine Cave, 
Comment, Trusts: Monkeying Around with Our Pets‟ Futures: Why Oklahoma Should Adopt a Pet-
Trust Statute, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 627, 632–44 (2002).  
 79. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hart, 311 P.2d 605, 614 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (involving 
will providing that the testator‘s ―domestic animals,‖ including horses and a burro, ―shall be kept in 
the Park and properly fed and cared for by‖ the devisee of the park property); In re Fouts, 677 
N.Y.S.2d 699, 699 (Sur. Ct. 1998) (involving an inter vivos trust for the benefit of five 
chimpanzees); In re Renner‘s Estate, 57 A.2d 836, 837 (Pa. 1948) (involving will providing for the 
care of the testator‘s dog and parrot); Hahn v. Stange, No. 04-07-00253-CV, 2008 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 1027, at *2 (Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008) (noting letter providing for the care of the decedent‘s 
―cats, numbering ten, and any more that may come along‖). Some testators use a broad category to 
encompass all possible types of pets. See, e.g., In re Estate of Verdisson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 364 
(Ct. App. 1992) (―‗I leave my pets to Mr. Wardaman [Vardanian] and $20,000.00 to take care of 
them upon my death.‘‖). 
 80. In re Howells‘ Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 602 (Sur. Ct. 1932). 
 81. As will be discussed below, some courts have enforced such arrangements on an ad hoc 
11
Foster: Should Pets Inherit?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
812 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
pets―be it by will, trust, or contract. Under the family paradigm of 
inheritance law, nonhuman survivors, no matter how beloved, are not 
―natural objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖ 
1.  Wills 
 Under the law of wills, pets cannot inherit. The Siamese cat or 
Labrador dog may have been the decedent‘s best friend and companion82 
and even the ―‗entire reason for her existence.‘‖83 Yet, if the decedent 
leaves all or part of her estate directly to her pet, the legacy is void. In the 
eyes of the law, the pet is mere property, with rights no greater than those 
of the decedent‘s ―living room sofa.‖84 Under the family paradigm of 
inheritance law, a decedent‘s pet may be her family during life but is only 
her property at death. And, just as ―a refrigerator cannot inherit the stove 
and kitchen sink,‖85 a pet cannot inherit. Property cannot own property.86 
 If a testator leaves money to a pet, the cash and even the pet itself may 
end up in the hands of the very person the testator did not want to benefit. 
Consider, for example, a case that is a staple of law school Trusts and 
Estates courses―In re Estate of Russell.87 Thelma Russell wrote a valid 
holographic will on a small card. On the front side, she left ―‗everything I 
                                                                                                                     
basis. See infra Part III.A. For extended discussion of ―grounds by which those courts have 
acquiesced in gifts for the benefit of pets,‖ see Beyer, supra note 78, at 635–49. 
 82. See, e.g., Waldecker v. Pfefferle, No. E-02-002, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6016, at *3–4 
(Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2002) (quoting Ruth A. Lovett‘s will, which stated that the testator ―‗had cats as 
friends and companions‘‖ and provided for her ―‗companion, [her] Siamese cat, SINBAD‘‖); Lewis 
Kamb & Jeffrey M. Barker, Dog Adds Twist to Raymond Case, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 
14, 2003, at A1 (quoting James McClintock‘s will, which described his black Labrador mix dog as 
a ―‗wonderful pet, who has been a faithful companion and friend for many years‘‖). 
 83. In re Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 127 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1964) (quoting the 
testator‘s doctor‘s testimony). 
 84. Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) (criticizing ―the law‘s cold 
characterization of a dog . . . as mere ‗property‘‖ and stating that ―[a] companion dog is not a living 
room sofa or dining room furniture‖); Jane Porter, It Can Be a Regular Dog Fight; Family Pets 
Involved in a Growing Number of Custody Cases, HARTFORD COURANT, July 10, 2006, at D1 
(stating that in courts, ―pets are still considered property, no different from the silverware, the 
plasma TV and the living-room sofa‖). 
 85. Sylvia Cochran, Who Will Take Care of Your Pet If You Die or Become Incapacitated?, 
(Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2790940/basic_estate_planning_for_ 
pets.html. 
 86. CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 67 (―Animals, by law, are property, and one 
piece of property cannot own another piece of property . . . .‖); Neil E. Hendershot, What the 
General Practitioner Needs to Know About Pennsylvania Animal Law (Part II): Personal and 
Estate Planning for Pennsylvanians Owning Pets, 77 PA. B. ASS‘N Q. 107, 115 (2006) (―[I]t is 
axiomatic under Pennsylvania law that property cannot own property. Therefore, a pet cannot 
inherit property.‖). 
 87. In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968). The case appears in many leading 
Trusts and Estates casebooks. See, e.g., CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, 
INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 388–93 
(Elias Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2007); WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 359–63 (Jesse Dukeminier et al. 
eds., 8th ed. 2009). 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/1
2011] SHOULD PETS INHERIT? 813 
 
own Real & Personal to Chester H. Quinn & Roxy Russell.‘‖88 On the 
back side, she bequeathed her ―‗Ten dollar gold Piece & diamonds‘‖ to her 
niece, Georgia.
89
 Thelma also left an address book in which she had 
written: ―‗Chester, Don‘t Let Augusta and Georgia have one penny of my 
place if it takes it all to fight it in Court.‘‖90 Unfortunately, Roxy Russell 
turned out to be Thelma‘s pet Airedale dog. The California Supreme Court 
declared Roxy‘s share of the residue void because ―a dog cannot be the 
beneficiary under a will.‖91 As a result, Roxy‘s share passed by intestacy to 
none other than Georgia, Thelma‘s sole intestate heir. 
 A legacy to a pet may have even more far-reaching consequences. It 
may lead to invalidation of the entire will on grounds of testamentary 
incapacity.
92
 As the trial court in Estate of Russell observed, ―To ascribe to 
her the belief that her dog could acquire real property with all the rights 
and obligations incident to ownership is to describe a person who would 
probably be incompetent to make a will at all.‖93 Indeed, will contestants 
have even gone so far as to cite a testator‘s indulgence of pets as evidence 
of mental incompetence.
94
 For example, a New York son argued that the 
fact that his father ―insisted upon a cat eating at the table with him, for 
which a place and chair were reserved‖ indicated that his father was ―in a 
very weak condition.‖95 Similarly, North Carolina nephews cited as 
evidence of their aunt‘s mental capacity: 
That she kept her dogs in the room with her. ―They had a 
bed and she had one.‖ She prepared for the dogs like she 
would one of the family; made cakes for them and bought 
candy for them and cooked chicken for them, and she cooked 
cakes for the dogs [sic] Christmas.
96
 
                                                                                                                     
 88. In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d at 355. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 356 n.4. 
 91. Id. at 363. 
 92. See CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 68 (reporting a case in which a local 
community foundation challenged an elderly woman‘s will leaving ―a rather large bequest‖ to 
D.E.L.T.A. (Dedication & Everlasting Love To Animals) Rescue in Southern California. The 
foundation‘s lawyers successfully ―argu[ed] that leaving money to animals was proof that the 
woman had to be crazy‖); see also Lynn Asinof, Bowser‟s Bequest; Your Pets Can‟t Inherit Your 
Money, but a Trust Could Provide for Their Care, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 22, 2002, Business Section, 
at 1 (stating that ―no one should leave millions to their pet, or there may be ‗an appearance that this 
person could be mentally unbalanced . . .‘‖ (quoting attorney Kenneth P. Brier)). 
 93. See WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 361 n.15 (quoting the trial court). 
 94. Admittedly, in some cases, a testator‘s treatment of pets in fact suggests lack of capacity. 
For example, in Davis v. Laughlin, will contestants presented evidence that the testator lacked 
mental capacity, which included ―her washing her dog in the kitchen sink and putting it in her bed 
and sleeping with it without so much as drying it; [] keeping the dog in her room and bed without 
letting it out until it soiled them; [and] tying her dog and cat together and then fastening the string 
to her ankle.‖ Davis‘ Ex‘r v. Laughlin, 133 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Ky. 1939).  
 95. Eckert v. Page, 146 N.Y.S. 513, 517 (App. Div. 1914). 
 96. In re Hargrove‘s Will, 173 S.E. 577, 578 (N.C. 1934). For more sympathetic judicial 
treatment of a testator‘s indulgence of pets, see Smith v. Smith, 47 S.W.2d 1036, 1039 (Ky. 1932) 
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 While direct legacies to pets are relatively rare, other testamentary 
arrangements for the care of pets are not. The most popular of these 
arrangements―trusts for pets―will be discussed below.97 Yet, these 
arrangements too have failed to ensure a secure future for a decedent‘s 
nonhuman loved ones. As one commentator observed, ―Historically, the 
approach of most American courts towards bequests for the care of specific 
animals has not been calculated to gladden the hearts of animal lovers.‖98 
 A common technique has been for a testator to leave cash, personal 
property, and/or a house
99
 to a trusted friend,
100
 relative,
101
 employee,
102
 or 
animal welfare organization
103
 subject to a stipulation that the legatee 
provide lifetime care for the testator‘s pet(s).104 In some cases, these 
arrangements involve specific pets. For example, Mary Johnston left to her 
employee, Harris Stanford, her horses, ―Bessie‖ and ―Daisy,‖ their saddles, 
harness, and other equipment, and $14,000.
105
 She stated that it was her 
―‗wish and direction‘‖ that Stanford apply the cash and any income ―‗to the 
care and maintenance of the said two (2) mares, according to his judgment 
                                                                                                                     
(―Doubtless there are many to whom the presence of dogs is offensive, but it would be going far 
afield to say that a childless old man was incapable of making a will because he loved dogs, 
permitted them to enter his room and jump upon his bed, when they came to his door, and, as he 
expressed it, ‗begged to be let in.‘‖); In re Van Den Heuvel‘s Will, 136 N.Y.S. 1109, 1122–23 (Sur. 
Ct. 1912) (characterizing the testator‘s ―exaggerated affection for her parrot‖ as an ―eccentricity‖ 
rather than evidence of mental incapacity). 
 97. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 98. Barbara W. Schwartz, Estate Planning for Animals, 113 TR. & EST. 376, 376 (1974). 
 99. The testator should also bequeath the pet to the chosen caretaker. Otherwise the pet would 
be part of the testator‘s general estate. 
 100. See, e.g., In re Andrews‘ Will, 228 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (quoting the will of 
Jennie M. Andrews, which provided: ―‗I give to Lucretia Shaffer $500.00, but as a condition of the 
legacy, require her to give my dog good care as long as the dog lives.‘‖); Stever v. Holt, 100 P.2d 
1016, 1022 (Ore. 1940) (involving will leaving the testator‘s house to Pearl Holt ―‗on the condition 
that the said Pearl Holt move into and make her home in the above-mentioned house and provide 
and care for the little dog Beauty and the cat Cutey‘‖). 
 101. See, e.g., In re Meyer‘s Will, 236 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (involving will leaving 
money to the testator‘s niece with the ―‗request that she take care of my pet cat ―OLLIE‖ during it‘s 
[sic] lifetime‘‖); In re Kieffer Estate, 21 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 406, 406 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1971) (involving 
will leaving the testator‘s estate to her niece ―to be used for Gigi and Diedrie two poodles to be used 
to take care of them and their puppies born up to the present time‖). 
 102. See, e.g., In re Johnston‘s Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221–22 (App. Div. 1950) (involving 
codicil leaving, inter alia, $14,000 to the testator‘s employee with the ―‗wish and direction‘‖ that he 
use it for the care of her two horses).  
 103. See, e.g., Waldecker v. Pfefferle, No. E-02-002, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6016, at *4 (Ct. 
App. Nov. 8, 2002) (involving will leaving the testator‘s entire estate to the ―‗Erie County Humane 
Society . . . . [and] direct[ing] that the Erie County Humane Society shall out of the proceeds of my 
estate, pay for the proper care and veterinary service of my Siamese cat, SINBAD, for the remainder 
of its natural life‘‖). 
 104. For extended discussion of U.S. judicial approaches to conditional bequests and other 
types of will provisions that leave property to a legatee with a pet care stipulation, see Beyer, supra 
note 78, at 640–46; Cave, supra note 78, at 637–40. 
 105. In re Johnston‟s Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 221–22. 
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and without restriction.‘‖106 
 In other cases, the will contains a broad, catch-all category. For 
instance, Anna Filkins left her automobile, house, and household 
furnishings to her sister-in-law, Lottie, ―‗expressly contingent upon 
[Lottie] furnishing proper care for any and all pets which [Anna] may own 
at the time of [her] decease for as long as they shall live.‘‖107 
 Unfortunately, Anna Filkins‘ and Mary Johnston‘s efforts to provide 
for their nonhuman survivors ultimately failed. The court ruled that 
Filkins‘ condition violated New York perpetuities law and awarded Lottie 
Filkins the property free and clear of any obligation to care for any 
surviving pets.
108
 Mary Johnston‘s effort proved equally unsuccessful. The 
court recognized that her intent was ―to insure a good home for her horses, 
and no doubt she expected her friend to utilize so much of the gift as he 
might deem necessary for that purpose.‖109 Nonetheless, it concluded that 
the particular wording of provision made care of Bessie and Daisy merely 
―precatory rather than mandatory.‖ Indeed, the court indicated that even if 
Stanford had chosen to ―dispose of [the horses] the very day he received 
the bequest,‖110 he would still inherit. 
 A close analysis of judicial decisions exposes a disturbing pattern of 
courts reading even the strongest language to favor a human legatee at the 
expense of the decedent‘s pets. A Washington case is illustrative. Anna 
Bradley left the residue of her estate to her ―‗dear friend and companion 
Hattie M. Peterson‘‖ and stated ―‗she must take good care of my dear cats, 
Sister, Daddy Bimbow, Jimmy John and Tricksey.‘‖111 The court 
acknowledged that Bradley‘s direction was ―imperatively worded.‖112 Yet, 
like the Johnston court, this court too interpreted the language to be 
precatory only. As a result, Hattie Peterson received the residue without 
any legal obligation to care for Bradley‘s cats. As for Sister, Daddy 
Bimbow, Jimmy John, and Tricksey, their fate was left to Peterson‘s 
―discretion and good will.‖113 The cats could only hope that Bradley‘s faith 
that ―her dear friend and companion [would] . . . comply with her request, 
or command,‖114 was not, in fact, misplaced. 
 Judicial interpretation of pet care provisions can lead to truly perverse 
results. For example, in a 1993 Pennsylvania case, Mamie Myrtle Bloch 
                                                                                                                     
 106. Id. 
 107. In re Filkins‘ Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (Sur. Ct. 1952). 
 108. Id. at 126 (―Since the condition is based upon the lives of several animals, it clearly is 
void under the statute against unlawful suspension of the power of alienation.‖). 
 109. In re Johnston‟s Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 223. 
 110. Id. In fact, the horses were ―disposed of‖ prior to Johnston‘s death. Less than five months 
after she wrote her codicil, Johnston was ―declared incompetent and a committee [was] appointed 
who subsequently disposed of the horses and the equipment for $175.00.‖ Id. at 222. Johnston died 
twenty years later, ―still an incompetent.‖ Id. 
 111. In re Bradley‘s Estate, 59 P.2d 1129, 1130–31 (Wash. 1936). 
 112. Id. at 1131.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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left her estate in equal shares to her lawyer‘s father and ―paramour.‖115 The 
will stated that the two legatees ―‗have agreed to care for my dog and cats 
for as long as said shall live.‘‖116 The two legatees never took care of the 
animals. Yet, they ended up with Bloch‘s estate. The court read the 
language ―agreed to care for‖ as simply an explanation of the ―motivation 
for wanting to make the gift to the legatees‖ rather than a condition for 
inheritance.
117
 
 The next subsection will show that judicial treatment of trusts for pets 
is equally troubling. As Professor William Reppy has observed, courts 
have invalidated these trusts ―even if the failure of such a trust would 
increase the risk that an animal will be put to death when the animal‘s 
owner dies.‖118 
2.  Trusts 
 Under the family paradigm of inheritance law, decedents have a moral 
responsibility to provide for dependent and vulnerable members of their 
immediate family.
119
 Trusts are supposed to be the ideal mechanism to 
protect family survivors who cannot support themselves due to age, 
disability, inexperience, or improvidence. By ―separat[ing] the benefits of 
ownership from the burdens of ownership,‖120 trusts, in the words of the 
Restatement, ―provid[e] property management for those who cannot, ought 
not, or wish not to manage for themselves.‖121 
 Yet, if the decedent uses a trust to support the ultimate dependent―a 
pet who relied entirely on the decedent for food, shelter, and care―the 
trust is not a ―true trust.‖122 At common law, a trust for an animal, even an 
animal the decedent called family, is at best an ―‗honorary trust,‘ . . . one 
binding the conscience of the trustee‖123 but not legally enforceable. 
 Just as under the law of wills, pets are not ―natural objects‖ but simply 
objects. They are property and are denied the status of beneficiary because 
                                                                                                                     
 115. In re Bloch, 625 A.2d 57, 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 116. Id. at 59. 
 117. Id. at 62. 
 118. William A. Reppy, Jr., Estate Planning to Provide for the Post-Death Care of Pets, in 
ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 217, 217 (Taimie L. Bryant et al. eds., 2008). 
 119. Friedman, supra note 34, at 358 (―The basic family unit in the United States is the nuclear 
family (husband, wife, and children). The head of the family has an obligation to support, educate, 
and care for his dependents; he has a moral obligation to make provision for them in the event of his 
death.‖). As I have argued elsewhere, under the family paradigm, ―the American inheritance 
system . . . . promote[s] support but limits its protections once again principally to the ‗natural 
objects of the decedent‘s bounty,‘ the decedent‘s closest surviving family members.‖ Foster, Family 
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 219. 
 120. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1 (4th 
ed. 1987). 
 121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. b(1) (2001). 
 122. Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (―A trust of this sort 
is not a true trust.‖). 
 123. In re Searight‘s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). 
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they have no legal standing to enforce a trust.
124
 Similarly, because pets are 
not human, they do not qualify as ―measuring lives‖ to prevent application 
of the rule against perpetuities.
125
 A person the decedent has never 
met―Queen Victoria‘s descendant, for instance126―counts as a measuring 
life. A pet who shared the decedent‘s life does not. Once again, when 
courts define pets as property, the animals come out the losers.
127
 
 Consider, for example, a Pennsylvania case. In 1946, John Renner, an 
unmarried retired policeman, died, survived by his dog and parrot, niece 
and nephew, and close friend, Mary Riesing.
128
  Renner‘s will bequeathed 
his pets
129
 and the residue of his estate to Riesing in trust ―‗for the 
maintenance of my pets, which I leave to her kind care and judgment, and 
for their interment upon their respective deaths in the Francisvale 
Cemetery.‘‖130 The court declared the trust invalid because there was no 
beneficiary ―who could call her to account.‖131 As a result, Riesing ended 
up with the pets and a substantial inheritance. The dog and parrot became 
her property, their very existence dependent upon ‗―her kind care and 
judgment.‘‖ 
 As countless pets have discovered, the rule against perpetuities
132
 has 
posed a particular threat to their well-being. Estate of Baier
133
 is 
illustrative. In 1939, Louise Baier, an elderly recluse, died. She had no 
living relatives. The ―chief if not only object of her affections‖134 was her 
cat, Tommy Tucker. Her will and codicil left $5,000 in trust ―‗to pay the 
net income therefrom for the care, maintenance, and burial of my pet and 
                                                                                                                     
 124. 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 17.21 
(Anderson Publ‘g 2003) (1963) (stating that in the case of trusts for animals ―[i]t is obvious that no 
beneficiary exists to enforce the trust and to compel the trustee to carry out the trust. Since trusts are 
usually defined in terms of the existence of a beneficiary and of enforceability, it may be better to 
refer to these as honorary trusts, or unenforceable trusts‖). 
 125. In re Mills‘ Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (Sur. Ct. 1952) (stating that the phrases ―‗lives 
in being‘ and ‗persons in being‘ as used in the statutes of perpetuities refer to human beings‖ and 
holding that a trust for the care of the decedent‘s pets was invalid because it ―was intended to be 
measured by the lives of animals and not human beings‖). 
 126. See WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 898 (―[T]he English solicitors 
developed a royal lives saving clause whereby the trust is to continue until 21 years after the death 
of all the descendants of Queen Victoria . . . living at the creation of the trust.‖). 
 127. Reppy, supra note 118, at 218. 
 128.  In re Renner‘s Estate, 57 A.2d 836, 837 (Pa. 1948). 
 129. Id. at 837. He also left her his ―‗home and garage . . . together with the entire contents 
thereof . . . and [his] flower garden . . . .‘‖ Id. (quoting Renner‘s will). 
 130. Id. (quoting Renner‘s will). 
 131. Id. at 838. 
 132. This includes local perpetuities statutes like New York‘s statute requiring that ―absolute 
ownership of property shall not be suspended for a period longer than during the continuance, and 
until the termination, of not more than two lives in being at the death of the testator.‖ In re Howells‘ 
Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 602–03 (Sur. Ct. 1932) (summarizing the New York statute). 
 133. Bequests for the Care of Animals, 74 N.Y. L. REV. 430, 430–31 (1940) (discussing the 
1940 New York case of Estate of Baier). 
 134. Id. at 430. 
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cat named ‗Tommy Tucker.‘‖135 Upon the cat‘s death, the remainder of the 
trust was to go to various institutions, including an animal hospital. No one 
challenged the validity of the income provision.
136
 Indeed, the remainder 
beneficiaries stated that they wanted the income to be spent on the cat‘s 
care. Yet, when the executors filed their account with the Surrogate‘s 
Court, the court declared the provision void on grounds that under New 
York perpetuities law, ―‗equitable and legal estates are limited to the lives 
of human beings.‘‖137 Where or even if Tommy Tucker lived out the rest of 
his nine lives was irrelevant. 
 Perpetuities rules have frustrated even the clearest expression of 
testamentary intent. For example, in another New York case,
138
 Camille 
Howells, like John Renner and Louise Baier, attempted to use a 
testamentary trust to provide a secure future for her two cats and three 
dogs. Howells was estranged from her husband and her sister, her ―sole 
next of kin,‖ and, as the court later put it, ―[t]he place in her affections 
usually occupied by family or relatives seem[ed] to have been taken by 
pets.‖139 Howells died with a will, which was ―apparently a homemade 
affair.‖140 The will disinherited the husband and sister and left the residue 
of Howells‘ estate in trust to provide ―‗for the care, comfort and 
maintenance of my pet animals.‘‖141 The court acknowledged that Howells 
was closer to her pets than to her human family members and that her 
intent was clear. The court stated: ―[T]he conclusion is inescapable that her 
dominant testamentary desire was to provide for the care and welfare of her 
pet animals who constituted her sole immediate family.‖142 Nonetheless, 
Howells‘ efforts to provide for her beloved pets after her death were in 
vain. The court found the trust void under New York perpetuities law. 
Howells‘ estate went by intestate succession to the very next of kin she had 
expressly disinherited in her will. Her pets were left to fend for themselves. 
Thus, the family paradigm‘s definition of ―natural objects‖ trumped 
Howells‘ actual relationships with her human and nonhuman family 
members. 
3.  Contracts to Devise 
 In a 1970 opinion, a Kentucky court stated that ―contracts to pay people 
for caring for dogs after the owners‘ deaths are rare.‖143 However, if 
reported cases are any guide, many Americans make just such 
arrangements to protect nonhuman loved ones in the event of their owners‘ 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. (quoting Baier‘s will). 
 136. Id. The issue was whether the executors and trustees could invade principal to reimburse a 
veterinary surgeon for costs incurred in caring for Tommy Tucker. Id. 
 137. Id. at 431 (quoting the opinion). 
 138. In re Howells‘ Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932). 
 139. Id. at 600–01. 
 140. Id. at 601. 
 141. Id. (quoting Howells‘ will). 
 142. Id. at 602. 
 143. Veluzat v. Janes, 462 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Ky. 1970). 
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disability or death. These arrangements often take the form of an oral 
contract to devise between the decedent and a trusted relative,
144
 friend,
145
 
or partner.
146
 The decedent agrees to leave all or part of her estate to the 
chosen caregiver in exchange for that individual‘s promise to care for the 
decedent‘s pet. 
 Two California cases are illustrative. In Collins v. McIlhany, a 
―professional comedian and comedy writer,‖147 Harrison Baker, promised 
to leave actress Ruth Collins the Rodeo Drive house she had been renting 
from him for several years.
148
 In return, she agreed to perform various 
services, including ―providing a lifetime of care for Baker‘s beloved dog 
Rusty.‖149 
 In Roy v. Salisbury, Edward Drucks used a similar mechanism to 
ensure that Mike, the doberman pinscher for whom he ―had a great 
affection,‖ received care if ―‗Drucks ever became unable to care for said 
dog, or, if he should die.‘‖150 Drucks made an oral contract with C.A. Roy, 
the breeder, trainer, and kennel owner who had originally sold Mike to 
Drucks. Roy agreed that Mike would be ―housed, fed and cared for by 
[Roy] for the remainder of said dog‘s life.‖151 In exchange, Drucks 
promised that Roy would receive his ―usual rate for boarding and caring 
for Doberman Pinschers.‖152 
 Rusty and Mike were probably lucky.
153
 After Baker‘s and Drucks‘ 
deaths, courts awarded the caregivers money for the care of the dogs.
154
 
                                                                                                                     
 144. See, e.g., In re Estate of Braaten, Probate No. DP 02-33, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1439, 
at *1–4, *7 (D. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), rev‟d, In re Estate of Braaten, 96 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Mont. 2004) 
(involving a contract to devise with the decedent‘s stepson for services, which included ―tak[ing] 
care of the dog, including feeding the dog, watering the dog, taking the dog to the vet and watching 
him while [the decedent] traveled‖). 
 145. See, e.g., Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 403 (Ct. App. 1996) (involving a 
contract to devise with the decedent‘s friends, in which ―decedent made a promise to them that she 
would will them the house they were renting if appellants would agree to care for her and her cats‖). 
Such contracts are often made with caregivers for the decedent as well as for the decedent‘s pets. 
See, e.g., Martin v. Turner, 218 S.E.2d 789, 790 (Ga. 1975) (involving ―an alleged oral contract 
between plaintiff and the deceased by which the deceased agreed to provide for plaintiff in his 
will . . . in return for her taking the deceased into her home, providing and caring for him for life, 
and caring for his dog‖). 
 146. See, e.g., In re Estate of Payne, 895 A.2d 428, 430 (N.J. 2006) (involving a claim by the 
decedent‘s partner that the decedent had promised to leave him his New Jersey house to provide a 
home for the partner and the decedent‘s dogs after the decedent‘s death). 
 147. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 2, Collins v. McIlhany, No. BC346013 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 11, 2008) (―Harrison Baker Jr. was a professional comedian and comedy writer since the 
1960s.‖). 
 148. Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *1–2, *4 n.2 
(Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009). 
 149. Id. at *2. 
 150. Roy v. Salisbury, 130 P.2d 706, 707 (Cal. 1942). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. This assumes that Collins and Roy in fact cared for the dogs as promised. 
 154. Roy, 130 P.2d at 707–08, 712; Collins, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *1. 
19
Foster: Should Pets Inherit?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
820 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
Unfortunately, however, these cases are exceptional. 
 Oral contracts to devise are even less likely than wills and trusts to 
guarantee a secure future for a decedent‘s pets. American inheritance law 
disfavors contracts to devise between decedents and caregivers.
155
 In a 
recent case that included a provision for care of the decedent‘s cat, a New 
York court underscored this hostility toward contracts to devise.
156
 It stated 
that ―claims made after death are viewed with great suspicion and tend to 
negate the existence of an implied contract because contradiction by the 
decedent is impossible.‖157 
 As a result, courts have imposed strict evidentiary standards for 
enforcement of such contracts.
158
 For example, in Todd v. Hyzer, a Florida 
couple (the Todds) claimed that their landlord, Clara Zearing, had 
promised to leave them the house they rented from her in exchange for 
providing various services, including care of the cat of which ―she was 
inordinately fond.‖159 The court denied their claim on grounds that the 
Todds failed to establish the contract ―by definite and unequivocal 
testimony.‖160 Other courts have required clear and convincing evidence of 
the contract.
161
 At least one court has suggested that oral contracts for the 
care of a decedent‘s pet may actually require stronger evidence than 
applied to more conventional contracts to devise.
162
 
 Local dead man‘s statutes have created further evidentiary problems. 
These statutes may exclude the only evidence that an oral contract in fact 
exists. The Kentucky case quoted above
163
 is illustrative. A young couple 
(the Pirrmans) asserted that they had an oral express contract with their 
now-deceased friend and neighbor, Lonnie Bradley.
164
 According to the 
Pirrmans, they had agreed that, after Bradley‘s death, they would care for 
his beloved pet chihuahua for the remainder of the dog‘s life. In return, 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Craddock v. Berryman, 645 P.2d 399, 402 (Mont. 1982) (―Contracts to make wills are 
looked upon with disfavor . . . .‖); Bentzen v. Demmons, 842 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1993) ( ―While equity will recognize oral contracts to devise, such contracts are not favored . . . .‖); 
see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 215–18 (discussing the negative treatment of 
contracts to devise between decedents and caregivers). 
 156. Estate of Truitt, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4818, at *1–2 (Sur. Ct. 2005). 
 157. Id. at *4. 
 158. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 216 & n.76 (discussing high evidentiary 
standards for contracts to devise). 
 159. Todd v. Hyzer, 18 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1944). 
 160. Id. at 890–91. 
 161. See, e.g., Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *9 
(Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009) (―To 
prevail, Collins had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Baker made an oral 
promise to leave her the Rodeo Drive property as ‗compensation for services rendered, or to be 
rendered . . . .‘‖ (quoting Drvol v. Bant, 183 Cal. App. 2d 351, 356 (Ct. App. 1960) (internal 
citation omitted))). 
 162. Veluzat v. Janes, 462 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) (―[S]ince contracts to pay 
people for caring for dogs after the owners‘ deaths are rare, we think it would take a fairly strong 
inference to warrant a finding of the existence of such a contract.‖). 
 163. Veluzat v. Janes, 462 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). 
 164. Id. at 195–97. 
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Bradley promised to pay them the ―reasonable value of such services.‖165 
The Pirrmans took the chihuahua into their home
166
 and filed a claim 
against Bradley‘s estate for the estimated value of dog care services. 
Unfortunately for the couple, their key evidence―Mrs. Pirrman‘s own 
testimony regarding the terms of the contract―was inadmissible under 
Kentucky‘s dead man‘s statute. Not surprisingly, the court concluded that 
the Pirrmans lacked sufficient evidence of a ―contractual understanding‖ 
with Bradley and dismissed the claim. 
 The statute of frauds has been another threat to decedents‘ efforts to 
provide for their nonhuman loved ones by contract. Consider, for instance, 
a surprisingly common scenario: an oral contract in which the decedent 
promises to leave her house to her pet‘s future caregiver.167 Under nearly 
every jurisdiction‘s statute of frauds, that contract is legally unenforceable 
because a contract to convey real property must be in writing.
168
 The 
caregiver‘s only possible remedy lies in equity. Thus, in the Collins case,169 
Ruth Collins (and Rusty?) did not end up in the Beverly Hills house (worth 
$2.2 million) Baker promised her.
170
 She did, however, recover in quantum 
meruit the value of her services―$111,124.171 
 The statute of frauds may frustrate a decedent‘s plans in another 
context as well―when an oral contract involves care of a pet only after the 
decedent‘s death. Thus, in the Roy case,172 the court conceded that Drucks‘ 
contract to provide for his beloved doberman would have failed if the ―sole 
provision of the contract was for the care of the dog in the event of 
decedent‘s death.‖173 In that situation, ―it would be a contract not to be 
performed during the lifetime of decedent, promisor, and therefore 
condemned by the statute of frauds.‖174 In the actual case, however, the 
court was able to effectuate Drucks‘ intent because ―death was not the sole 
alternative‖175 in the contract at issue. The contract also provided for 
Mike‘s care if Drucks ―became unable‖ to do so.176 Since the contract 
could conceivably have been performed during Drucks‘ lifetime, the statute 
of frauds did not apply. 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Id. at 196. 
 166. Mrs. Pirrman actually ―took the dog and thereafter cared for it‖ after the death of 
Bradley‘s wife, who predeceased him. Id. at 200. 
 167. See supra notes 145, 159–60 and accompanying text (discussing two examples of such 
cases, Estate of Brenzikofer and Todd v. Hyzer). 
 168. Veluzat, 462 S.W.2d at 196 (stating that oral express contracts are not enforceable under 
the statute of frauds ―if they embrace real estate‖); see WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, 
at 548, 595 (stating that ―the Statute of Frauds in virtually every state prevents the enforcement‖ of 
an oral express trust where the owner of real property conveys land). 
 169. See supra notes 147–49, 153–54 and accompanying text (discussing Collins v. McIlhany). 
 170. Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *2 (Ct. App. 
Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009). 
 171. Id. at *4–5. 
 172. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text (discussing Roy v. Salisbury). 
 173. Roy v. Salisbury, 130 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. 1942). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 707. 
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 Finally, even a decedent‘s efforts to put a pet care contract in writing 
may fail if the decedent does not comply with contractual formalities. 
Consider, for example, Maggie Goodwin‘s attempt to provide for her dog, 
Madam Shan.
177
 Goodwin gave her friend, Charlie Dailey, a check for 
$7,000 to be paid ―‗from my estate as mentioned in letter‘‖ and a written 
document stating:  
―I Maggie M. Goodwin of sound mind do hereby 
artharize [sic] Charlie Dailey to rite [sic] this check on me for 
$7,000.00 to bee [sic] paid out of my estate to Charlie Dailey 
and he is to care for my dog Madam Shan for her lifetime and 
beried [sic] in a pine box at the foot of my grave . . . .‖178  
Unfortunately, Goodwin‘s plans for Madam Shan‘s future were 
unsuccessful. In Dailey v. Adams, an Arkansas court held that she did not 
create a valid contract because Dailey did not sign the document or provide 
any consideration.
179
 As a result, Dailey ―was not entitled to the money and 
thus could not carry out the owner‘s intent regarding Madam Shan.‖180 In 
the end, then, Madam Shan was the real loser. She―like so many pets 
decedents thought they had protected―could only hope that someone 
would care for her pro bono. 
4.  Execution Defects 
 Dailey v. Adams illustrates how legal formalities can be a trap for the 
unwary pet owner and can doom a nonhuman loved one to an uncertain 
future. This problem is by no means limited to the contractual context. 
Indeed, according to the court, Maggie Goodwin‘s arrangement for Madam 
Shan‘s care failed on all counts.181 It did not comply with the requirements 
for wills, inter vivos gifts, gifts causa mortis, or contracts.
182
 Goodwin‘s 
legal expertise (or lack thereof) was irrelevant. So too was her intent and 
her relationship with Madam Shan. As for Madam Shan, the court did not 
even acknowledge that its decision would likely compromise the dog‘s 
chances for a long and happy life. 
 Other pets have suffered a similar fate. Even the most minor execution 
defects have defeated decedents‘ efforts to ensure a secure future for their 
nonhuman survivors. For example, Timothy Saueressig‘s will183 with its 
directions regarding care of his ―‗family‘‖―his four cats―was denied 
probate because only one of two witnesses signed the will.
184
 Mary 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Dailey v. Adams, 319 S.W.2d 34, 35–36 (Ark. 1958). 
 178. Id. at 35–36. 
 179. Id. at 36. 
 180. Beyer, supra note 78, at 634 (discussing Dailey v. Adams). 
 181. Dailey, 319 S.W.2d at 36–37. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing Estate of Saueressig). 
 184. Estate of Saueressig, 136 P.3d 201, 202, 209 & n.11 (Cal. 2006). Saueressig had a notary 
public notarize the execution of his will. Id. at 202. ―[T]he only reasonable inference to be drawn 
from the decedent‘s conduct is that he believed the notarization would validate his will.‖ Id. at 202 
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Kleinman‘s handwritten document, providing a $30,000 trust and lengthy 
list of instructions for the care of her cat, Troy, failed as well because it 
disposed of money rather than personal property.
185
 Frederick and Bertha 
Leibolds‘ efforts to ensure ―faithful and loving care‖ for their bulldog, 
Peggy, was equally unsuccessful.
186
 Although their will was titled ―Joint 
Will and Testament,‖ a Colorado court rejected it due to insufficient proof 
that the couple had agreed to make ―mutual wills.‖187 
 In many cases, a pet ends up unprotected simply because the decedent 
was a layperson unfamiliar with legal requirements. Consider, for example, 
Beatrice Katz‘s attempt to provide for D.D., the ―feline friend who sat at 
her side.‖188 In 1988, Katz, a frugal retired secretary with a knack for 
―shrewd investments,‖189 executed a will. The will left the bulk of her 
estate in trust for her then-living cat, Blackie, with the remainder to go, if 
Blackie predeceased Katz, to twenty charities. Blackie subsequently died 
and Katz adopted D.D. One day, she decided to update her will to provide 
for D.D. She took out the will and ―scratched out all references to ‗Blackie‘ 
and simply left references to her ‗cat.‘‖190 Unfortunately for D.D., Katz did 
not know that, under Florida law, to change her will she had to re-execute 
it in accordance with statutory requirements. Thus, her handwritten 
changes were effectively ―invisible.‖191 After Katz‘s death, the charities 
rather than D.D. were entitled to her estate.
192
 
 At worst, a decedent‘s failure to understand, let alone comply with, 
execution requirements can result in her property and even her pets going 
to the very people she does not want to benefit. In re Estate of Tyrrell
193
 is 
illustrative. Mary Tyrrell handwrote a will on note paper. On the first page, 
below an embossed coat of arms, she stated: ―‗This is my last and only 
Will.‘‖194 She then set out on three pages how she wanted her real and 
personal property distributed. She left nearly her entire estate to the 
―‗Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in Phoenix or in other 
words . . . the Humane Society‘‖ and directed: ―‗All pet dumb animals that 
I leave are to be taken the best care of till they die a natural death and I 
                                                                                                                     
n.3. The notary‘s husband heard Saueressig ask the notary to notarize the will, saw Saueressig sign 
the will, and saw the notary notarize the will and was ―ready and willing to sign the will as a 
witness‖ after Saueressig‘s death. Id. at 202–03. 
 185. In re Estate of Kleinman, 970 P.2d 1286, 1287–89 (Utah 1998). 
 186. Ireland v. Jacobs, 163 P.2d 203, 204 (Colo. 1945). 
 187. Id. at 204, 208. 
 188. Jim Ross, A Frugal Life Turns Up Unexpected Riches, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct. 
28, 1993, at 12. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. Katz made other changes as well. For example, her original will left $5,000 to her 
neighbors, Leslie and Ruth Carroll, with whom Blackie was going to live. Id. She later changed the 
$5,000 legacy to ―balance of my estate.‖ Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. Apparently, the Carrolls were the ultimate ―good neighbors.‖ They were willing to 
take care of D.D. and ―refuse[d] to complain or mount a legal challenge.‖ Id. 
 193. In re Estate of Tyrrell, 153 P. 767 (Ariz. 1915). 
 194. Id. at 767–68. 
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request the officers of the Humane Society to see that my wishes are 
faithfully carried out.‘‖195 Tyrrell specifically stated: ―‗I leave nothing to 
any person or persons.‘‖196 
 Tyrrell put the will in an envelope that was ―of the same quality and 
color as that of the note paper.‖197 On the envelope, she wrote the 
following words: ―‗This is my last and only will. To be opened and acted 
upon by the Officers of the Humane Society in Phoenix.‘‖198 She then 
made what turned out to be the fatal error. She put her signature on the 
envelope but not on the note paper. 
 After Tyrrell‘s death, her will was denied probate because her 
―signature [was] not placed anywhere on the instrument.‖199 The court 
acknowledged that the envelope and the will were entirely written by the 
deceased as required by Arizona‘s holographic will statute. Moreover, it 
conceded that ―[t]he most reasonable inference to be drawn is that she was 
unaware of the necessity of signing the paper to give it 
authenticity . . . [and] it is most probable that she would have signed the 
paper . . . when such an act would have concluded all doubts as to her 
intention.‖200 Nonetheless, the court concluded that ―in the absence of a 
compliance with the statutory provision in the matter of signing, her 
intention to sign cannot be regarded.‖201 As a result, Tyrrell‘s estate, 
including her pets, went by intestacy exactly where she did not want it to 
go―to the ―persons‖202 the family paradigm declares her natural objects, 
Tyrrell‘s ―closest‖ human family members. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF REFORM STRATEGIES 
 The failure of American inheritance law to protect decedents‘ pets has 
not escaped the notice of legal reformers. Reformers of every 
stripe―judges, legislators, lawyers, and scholars alike―have offered three 
main strategies to address defects in existing rules and doctrines: (1) 
enforcing pet care arrangements on an ad hoc basis; (2) improving legal 
mechanisms to provide for decedents‘ pets; and (3) redefining the legal 
status of pets. These strategies offer significant improvements over the 
current system. Yet, they ultimately provide only partial solutions because 
they fail to challenge the family paradigm. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 195. Id. at 768. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 767. 
 198. Id. at 768. 
 199. Id. at 769. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 769–70. 
 202. Id. at 768  (quoting Tyrrell‘s will stating ―‗I leave nothing to any person or persons . . .‘‖). 
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A.  Ad Hoc Judicial Responses 
 Although courts generally have frustrated decedents‘ efforts to provide 
for their nonhuman loved ones,
203
 a few courts, as Professor Gerry Beyer 
has observed, ―have been much kinder to pets and their owners.‖204 Indeed, 
some courts have actually praised such efforts. Thus, an Ohio court 
described care of a pet dog as a ―worthy purpose.‖205 A Kentucky court 
declared ―humane‖206 a will provision that left $1,000 to ensure that the 
decedent‘s dog, Dick, ―‗be kept in comfort, . . . [be] well fed, have a bed in 
the house by a fire and [be] treated well every day . . . [for] his 
lifetime.‘‘‘207 On an ad hoc basis, courts have applied creative reasoning 
and remedies to uphold pet care arrangements.
208
 
 Searight‟s Estate209 provides a ―textbook example‖210 of this ―kinder 
and gentler approach.‖211 George Searight bequeathed his dog, Trixie, to 
Florence Hand and directed his executor to deposit $1,000 in a bank ―‗to 
be used by him to pay Florence Hand at the rate of 75 cents per day for the 
keep and care of [Searight‘s] dog as long as it shall live.‘‖212 As discussed 
above,
213
 most courts would have found this arrangement invalid under the 
rule against perpetuities because Searight‘s will used Trixie rather than a 
human being as the measuring life. This court, however, saved the 
provision for Trixie with a decidedly unorthodox
214
 approach to the rule 
against perpetuities. Applying a ―simple mathematical computation,‖215 the 
court calculated that at a rate of seventy-five cents per day, the fund would 
                                                                                                                     
 203. See supra Part II.B. 
 204. Beyer, supra note 78, at 635. 
 205. In re Searight‘s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). 
 206. Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 741 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923). This characterization was 
important because Kentucky‘s distinctive statute validated ―grants, conveyances, devises, 
gifts . . . for any . . . charitable or humane purpose.‖ Id. at 740 (emphasis added). 
 207. Id. at 739.  
 208. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 78, at 635 (stating that courts have validated honorary trusts 
as not ―violating the rule against perpetuities, either through the use of creative legal reasoning or 
by limiting their duration to twenty-one years‖); Cave, supra note 78, at 641, 645 (referring to 
courts‘ ―creative legal reasoning‖ and ―creative jurisprudence in bypassing the [rule against 
perpetuities]‖).  
 209. Searight‟s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 779. 
 210. Jennifer R. Taylor, A „Pet‟ Project for State Legislatures: The Movement Toward 
Enforceable Pet Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419, 422 (1999). 
Searight‟s Estate is literally a ―textbook example.‖ It appears in several Animal Law and Trusts and 
Estates casebooks. See, e.g., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 609–13 (Sonia S. Waisman et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2006); ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS, supra note 118, at 213–16; FAMILY PROPERTY 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 13-46―13-47 (Lawrence 
W. Waggoner et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006); WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 582–84. 
 211. CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 72. 
 212. Searight‟s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 780. 
 213. See supra notes 132–42 and accompanying text. 
 214. See WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 585 (describing the court‘s approach 
as inconsistent ―with the orthodox understanding of the Rule‖). 
 215. Searight‟s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 783. 
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be exhausted within four years and fifty-seven and a half days.
216
 Thus, the 
court concluded that it was ―very apparent‖ that Searight had ―provided a 
time limit . . . much less than the maximum period allowed under the 
rule‖―a human life in being plus twenty-one years.217 
 Pennsylvania courts have proven to be particularly friendly to pet care 
arrangements.
218
 For instance, in a 1979 case, the decedent left the residue 
of her estate to her executor in trust ―for the maintenance, care and 
feeding‖ of her three cats, Preserved, Marmalade, and Relish.219 The court 
acknowledged that the trust could not be given effect because the trust 
lacked a beneficiary that could legally enforce the trust. Nonetheless, the 
court concluded that the decedent‘s ―four-footed friends‖ should not ―live 
the rest of their natural lives without adequate funds.‖220 The solution was 
a $5,000 reserve fund, under which the executor would pay the decedent‘s 
housekeeper $75 per month to care for the three cats in her home.
221
 
 Although this ad hoc judicial approach has achieved justice in 
individual cases, it has a serious flaw. It provides no conceptual framework 
or uniform rationale for recognizing pet care arrangements.
222
 Some courts 
have enforced such arrangements without providing any explanation 
whatsoever for their decisions.
223
 Other courts have focused on the 
wording of the specific instrument at issue. Thus, a Pennsylvania court 
stated that in approaching a trust for animals, ―[t]he choice of method in 
any case depends upon the language and dispositive provisions of the 
will.‖224 
 Still other courts have emphasized decedent intent. For example, in 
Stever v. Holt, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld Catherine Canaris‘ will, 
which devised her house to Pearl Holt, a friend she ―regarded . . . as a 
daughter,‖225 ―‗on the condition that Pearl Holt move into and make her 
                                                                                                                     
 216. Id. This was based on a rate of 6% interest per year. Id. 
 217. See id. (analyzing under RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 374 (1944)). 
 218. For a review of three such cases, see Beyer, supra note 78, at 637–39. 
 219. Stewart Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 488, 489 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1979). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 490. The court drew on Pennsylvania ―precedent for creating a reserve of sufficient 
funds for the benefit of the pets, in order to accomplish the intent of the decedent and where the 
executrix has agreed to undertake the responsibility.‖ Id. 
 222. Indeed, in some cases, the court does not even address the provision for the decedent‘s 
pet. For example, in Estate of Gonzalez, a Maine court upheld a handwritten will on a preprinted 
will form through a liberal interpretation of the state‘s holographic will execution requirements. 
Estate of Gonzalez, 855 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Me. 2004). One beneficiary of this decision was the 
decedent‘s Jack Russell Terrier, Magnolia. Gonzalez‘s will left Magnolia ―along with $5000 dollars 
for the care of said animal‖ to a New Hampshire woman. Id. at 1148. 
 223. See generally Beyer, supra note 78, at 649 (stating that courts ―have also approved gifts 
for the benefit of pet animals without actually stating a legal basis for the approval‖ and citing 
examples). In many other cases, courts do not discuss the validity of such gifts ―either because no 
one challenges the gift or the issue is not reached for any of a variety of reasons.‖ Id. at 646; see id. 
at 646–49 (discussing examples). 
 224. In re Templeton Estate, 4 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 2d 172, 174 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1984). 
 225. Stever v. Holt, 100 P.2d 1016, 1023 (Or. 1940). 
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home in the above-mentioned house and provide and care for the little dog 
Beauty and the cat Cutey.‘‖226 Canaris‘ caregiver claimed she was entitled 
to the decedent‘s entire estate under an oral contract to devise made four 
years after the will. The court rejected the claim, stressing that ―[i]f the 
alleged contract . . . was actually made, this provision for the disposition of 
the home and care for the pets, which Mrs. Canaris must have deemed 
important, is defeated.‖227 
 A Pennsylvania court pushed the decedent intent argument even 
further.
228
 The court was presented with Florence Lyon‘s admittedly229 
defective attempt to create a testamentary trust to support her dogs and 
horses.
230
 The court first invoked decedent intent to denounce conventional 
limits on honorary trusts for animals. It stated: ―The idea that ‗honorary 
trusts‘ should be invalid emphasizes form over substance and neglects the 
responsibility of the court to ascertain the intent of the testatrix and give 
effect to it so far as is possible.‖231 The court then cited Pennsylvania‘s 
special commitment to effectuating decedent intent to assert that Lyon‘s 
will provisions for her animals ―should be carried out if it can be done.‖232 
Finally, the court used decedent intent as a rationale for reducing the 
amount Lyon left for care of her dogs and horses from $1.4 million to 
$150,000.
233
 According to the court, the decedent‘s ―actual intent [was] 
better served by computing a reasonable figure for such purpose.‖234  
 Several judicial opinions suggest yet another possible basis for 
upholding pet care arrangements―the court‘s attitude toward the parties 
involved in the case. This seems to be particularly true in cases involving 
oral contracts to devise, where, as a Florida court put it, ―specific 
performance is not a matter of right even when the contract is clear and 
unambiguous, but a matter of discretion.‖235 
 Two California appellate decisions illustrate this additional basis. 
Estate of Brenzikofer
236
 featured the ultimate sympathetic plaintiffs, John 
and Mary Wright. The Wrights claimed that they had entered into an oral 
contract to devise with their friend and landlord, Elnora Brenzikofer. They 
stated that, after Brenzikofer became an invalid, she promised to leave 
them the house they rented from her in exchange for the Wrights‘ 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Id. at 1022 (quoting Canaris‘ will). 
 227. Id. 
 228. In re Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
 229. Id. at 478 (stating that the trust ―cannot be given effect because testatrix does not name a 
person, corporation or association with a beneficial interest capable of enforcing the duties of the 
trustee‖). 
 230. Id. at 475 & n.1 (discussing Lyon‘s will). 
 231. Id. at 478. In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the ―rule of the Restatement.‖ Id. at 
481. 
 232. Id. at 481. 
 233. Id. at 482–83. The court concluded that ―testatrix mistook the amount of money necessary 
to provide for the animals.‖ Id. at 483. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Todd v. Hyzer, 18 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 1944). 
 236. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401 (Ct. App. 1996). 
27
Foster: Should Pets Inherit?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
828 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
agreement to care for her and her cats. After Brenzikofer‘s death, the court 
supported their claim for quasi-specific performance. The court 
emphasized the Wrights‘ extraordinary ―conduct in failing to move from 
the location and in taking care of decedent and her numerous cats over 26 
years.‖237 The Wrights fed and cleaned the animals, made special meals for 
the cats, and even ―built a facility in their own back yard so as to avoid 
placing the cats in a kennel.‖238 
 In contrast, in the Collins case discussed above,
239
 the court‘s negative 
view of the defendant appeared to be the main basis for upholding Ruth 
Collins‘ alleged contract to devise with Harrison Baker. The contract 
included provisions for the care of Baker‘s dog, Rusty.240 The court quoted 
at length the trial court‘s characterization of the defendant, William 
McIlhany, the principal beneficiary of Baker‘s will and trust.241 The trial 
court described McIlhany as ―completely lacking in credibility‖ and cited 
his ―lack of resources, his history of shrewd manipulation and motive to lie 
in th[e] trial . . . [, and] ‗the manner and circumstances under which he 
thrust himself into the disposition of Baker‘s property.‘‖242 The court made 
particular note of the fact that McIlhany had ―‗personally prepared‘‖ 
Baker‘s will and trust, which were ―‗only fully executed merely days 
before [Baker] died of merkle cell cancer, while Baker was heavily 
medicated.‘‖243 
 Thus, the ad hoc judicial approach ultimately provides uncertain 
protection for a decedent‘s nonhuman loved ones. The fate of a decedent‘s 
pets depends entirely on whether the court is a friend or foe.
244
 As the next 
section will show, legal practitioners, scholars, and legislators have 
responded with more predictable schemes to promote care of a decedent‘s 
pets. 
B.  Efforts to Improve Legal Mechanisms to Protect a Decedent‟s Pets 
 Reformers have pursued a second strategy to provide enhanced 
protection for decedents‘ pets. They have developed testamentary, 
nontestamentary, and legislative approaches to minimize judicial 
interference with pet care arrangements. Although this strategy can reduce 
the impact of family paradigm-based rules of inheritance, it too ultimately 
fails to ensure decedents‘ pets a secure future. 
                                                                                                                     
 237. Id. at 405. 
 238. Id. at 403.   
 239. See supra notes 147–49, 154, 169–71 and accompanying text. 
 240. Collins v. McIlhany, No. B200696, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9676, at *2, 4 (Ct. 
App. Dec. 2, 2008), review denied, No. S169681, 2009 LEXIS 1528 (Cal. Feb. 25, 2009).  
 241. Id. at *6–7. McIlhany, ―a consultant for television programs about the history of magic,‖ 
id. at *4 n.2, was also the trustee of Baker‘s trust. Id. at *3. 
 242. Id. at *6 & n.5, *7 n.6 (quoting the trial court). 
 243. Id. at *2 (quoting the trial court). In contrast, ―[t]he trial court concluded ‗plaintiff [was] 
believable and has clearly proven her case.‘‖ Id. at *10 (quoting the trial court). 
 244. CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 65 (titling the chapter ―The Courts: Friend 
or Foe?‖). 
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1.  Testamentary and Nontestamentary Approaches 
 Estate planning for pets is a booming business.
245
 Lawyers across the 
country report that clients of every demographic and income level 
increasingly want to include their nonhuman loved ones in their estate 
plans.
246
 For New Jersey solo practitioner Elenora Benz, pet trusts have 
become so popular that they are one of her ―niche areas.‖247 She has 
drafted trusts for the care of dogs, cats, horses, boa constrictors, and even a 
hedgehog.
248
 Oregon partner J. Alan Jensen is called the ―pet guy‖ because 
of his expertise in estate planning for pets.
249
 Even lawyers who do not 
specialize in pet care issues now ask clients about post-mortem 
arrangements for pets and include questions about pets in their preliminary 
estate planning checklists and questionnaires.
250
 
 Legal practitioners have pursued a common strategy. They have 
promoted testamentary and nontestamentary devices to protect a decedent‘s 
nonhuman loved ones from the family paradigm-based rules of inheritance. 
One approach has been to craft documents that will avoid or at least 
minimize the impact of traditional judicial obstacles to enforcement of pet 
care arrangements. For instance, in drafting wills, lawyers have taken a 
number of precautions to prevent courts from invalidating provisions for 
pets. They designate human beings or other legal persons rather than 
animals as beneficiaries.
251
 They limit the amount left for the care of pets 
                                                                                                                     
 245. This is particularly true in states that have adopted pet trust legislation. Andrew Tran, 
Polly Wants an Estate Planner; More People Are Providing for Pets in Their Wills, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 19, 2007, at 1A (―More people are leaving money for their pets as 
states pass laws legalizing pet trusts. As a result, estate lawyers and special animal care 
businesses―both big and small―have emerged to cater to pets when their owners die.‖); see also 
Rick Miller, Owners Setting Up Their Furred and Feathered Friends for Life; Pet Trusts Are a 
Business Opportunity that Financial Advisers May Be Missing, INVESTMENT NEWS, Aug. 15, 2005, 
at 3 (―Demand for pet trusts is on the rise . . . .‖).  
 246. Tracy Carbasho, Pet Issues Becoming Increasingly Important Factor in Estate, Divorce 
Settlements, LAW. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at 3 (reporting that ―clients from all demographics and income 
brackets express concern about providing for their pets in their will‖). 
 247. Dick Dahl, Estate Planners Find New Niche: Pet Trusts, ST. LOUIS DAILY RECORD, June 
10, 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4185/is_20060610/ai_n16477623/?tag=content; 
col1; see also Amy Davidson: Portland Estate Planning Lawyer and Guardianship Attorney, LAW 
OFFICES OF NAY & FRIEDENBERG, http://www.naylaw.com/attorneys/amy_davidson.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2011) (hosting Portland law firm‘s Web site stating that the firm‘s attorney Amy Davidson 
―has developed a special expertise in pet trusts and planning for our animal-loving clients‖). 
 248. Dahl, supra note 247. 
 249. Asinof, supra note 92. 
 250. See, e.g., Rachel Hirschfeld, Ensure Your Pet‟s Future: Estate Planning for Owners and 
Their Animal Companions, 9 MARQ. ELDER‘S ADVISOR 155, 162 (2007) (stating that practioners 
should ―add the question, ‗Do you have a pet?‘‖ to their ―intake questionnaire‖); Estate Plan 
Questionnaire, LAW OFFICE OF NICOLE A. DAVIDSON, http://www.nicoledavidsonlaw.com/uploads/ 
Estate_Plan_Questionnaire.rev7.17.09.pdf (last updated July 17, 2009) (―9. Do you have any pets 
that should be included in your estate plan?‖). 
 251. See, e.g., Stephanie B. Casteel, Estate Planning for Pets, PROB. & PROP., Nov.–Dec. 
2007, at 9 (stating that outright gifts to pets are not valid because an animal is property and offering 
clients two alternatives: ―a direct gift of a pet, as well as a cash bequest to defray the costs of care, 
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to avoid the ‗―appearance that [the donor] could be mentally 
unbalanced.‘‖252 Some legal professionals have specifically addressed the 
traditional problems with judicial interpretation of conditional bequests. 
For example, Professor Gerry Beyer suggests that testators clarify in their 
wills whether they want their pet‘s caregiver to ―receive[] the property only 
if the caregiver actually cares for the animal.‖253 
 Lawyers have also focused on the risks of the rule against perpetuities. 
Thus, Boston lawyer Kenneth Brier offers the following clause to ensure 
that a pet trust complies with the rule against perpetuities: ―The trust under 
this Article [trust for pets] shall terminate upon the earlier of (1) the death 
of the survivor of all of the animals identified in [cite paragraph] or (2) the 
expiration of twenty-one (21) years following the death of the survivor of 
[original individual trustees and/or animal caretakers] . . . .‖254 
 In addition, legal professionals have adopted a second approach to 
promote decedents‘ efforts to provide for pets. They have recommended 
nontestamentary will substitutes to bypass the family paradigm-oriented 
probate system altogether. Proponents argue that revocable trusts are a 
particularly useful technique to avoid the costs, delay, and family bias of 
the probate system.
255
 As a result, revocable trusts are becoming the most 
popular legal
256
 device for individuals to leave property to loved 
ones―nonhuman as well as human―who do not fit society‘s definitions of 
―natural objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖257 
                                                                                                                     
to an individual . . . [or] the client could give an individual or fiduciary the power and discretion to 
find a suitable home for the pet‖). Attorney Stephanie Casteel also emphasizes that ―[u]nless a state 
has a specific statute, a pet may not be named as the beneficiary of a trust.‖ Id. Her solution is to 
designate a ―human caregiver . . . as the beneficiary of a trust and [to] give[] specific duties and 
responsibilities for the care of a pet.‖ Id. at 9–10.  
 252. Asinof, supra note 92 (quoting Kenneth P. Brier). 
 253. Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Trusts: Fido with a Fortune? 17 (Tex. Tech. Sch. of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2010-22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1519123; see also PEGGY R. HOYT, ALL MY CHILDREN WEAR FUR COATS: HOW TO LEAVE A 
LEGACY FOR YOUR PET 94–95 (2008) (discussing conditional bequests). 
 254. Michael Hayes, When the Client Wants to Leave It to the Cat, J. ACCT., July 2001, at 29, 
31 (reproducing Brier‘s sample provision). 
 255. See, e.g., HOYT, supra note 253, at 75–77 (discussing the use of revocable inter vivos 
trusts for care of pets to ―avoid the probate process along with its judicial oversight‖ and stating that 
for many individuals probate ―is an expensive, time-consuming and public process‖); Foster, supra 
note 18, at 571 (stating that individuals use revocable trusts to ―avoid the costs, strictures, and 
family bias of the probate system and give settlors control over their property at death as well as 
during life‖). 
 256. Nonlegal, informal arrangements are likely more common. For example, there may be ―an 
‗understanding‘ that a friend, neighbor or relative will care for a dog if the owner can‘t.‖ MARY 
RANDOLPH, DOG LAW 10/1 (3d ed. 1997); see also KIMBERLY ADAMS COLGATE, THE PET PLAN AND 
PET TRUST GUIDE 41–43 (2008) (stating that most people ―feel they have adequately provided for 
their pet by making arrangements (usually a verbal agreement) with a family member or friend to 
take their pet when they are gone‖ and detailing the ―countless reasons why this type of agreement 
does not provide the security [the] pet needs‖). 
 257. Susan R. Abert, Pet Trusts: The Uniform Trust Code Gives Enforceability a New Bite, 
N.H. B.J., Winter 2006, at 18, 21 (―In New Hampshire, most pet trusts will be drafted as inter vivos 
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 Some legal professionals and commentators have looked instead to 
contractual methods to bypass the probate system. Specifically, they have 
recommended lifetime or perpetual care contracts.
258
 Under these 
arrangements, an individual enters into a written agreement with a person 
(often a veterinarian)
259
 or animal care organization to provide lifetime 
medical care, food, shelter, and other services for any pets who may 
survive her.
260
 The pet owner makes payment in the form of, for example, 
a lump sum amount,
261
 ―a certain amount as a credit toward expected 
services,‖262 life insurance,263 or a pledge to leave a bequest to the 
prospective care provider in a will or trust.
264
 Animal care organizations 
take a variety of forms, such as for-profit pet retirement homes, humane 
societies, and university veterinary school pet care programs.
265
 
 Texas A&M University‘s Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care 
Center is illustrative.
266
 The Center is located on ten acres and includes a 
bird sanctuary, stable, five large fenced yards and even a sunroom for 
cats.
267
 For an upfront enrollment fee of $1,000 per small animal or $2,000 
per large animal and a future endowment by will or trust of $50,000 to 
$210,000 (depending on the size of the animal and age of the owner),
268
 pet 
                                                                                                                     
trusts, so as to avoid continuing probate court oversight that will occur with a testamentary trust.‖); 
Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1375 (stating that reformers ―have shown that will 
substitutes, such as revocable trusts, . . . are particularly useful for individuals whose loved ones do 
not fit society‘s notion of ‗natural objects of the testator‘s bounty‘‖). 
 258. Commentators use various names for such arrangements. See, e.g., HOYT, supra note 253, 
at 136 (discussing ―perpetual care contract[s] for . . . pet[s]‖); Hirschfeld, supra note 250, at 164–
65 (recommending the ―Hirschfeld Pet Protection Agreement‖); Amber Koehn, Bequeathing Pets 
Eases Minds, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Sept. 1, 2003, http://cjonline.com/stories/090103/pet_philo.shtml 
(discussing the Cat Association of Topeka‘s ―Lifetime Care Contract‖). 
 259. See CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 103–06, 137 (discussing pet care 
contracts with veterinarians and providing a sample contract); RANDOLPH, supra note 256, at 10/12–
10/14 (same). 
 260. This arrangement may also be used for care of pets if the pet owner becomes disabled. 
See, e.g., Hirschfeld, supra note 250, at 165 (recommending that a pet owner include in the 
agreement a retirement home ―that will care for the pet upon the owner‘s disability or death‖). 
 261. HOYT, supra note 253, at 128–29; RANDOLPH, supra note 256, at 10/12–10/13. 
 262. RANDOLPH, supra note 256, at 10/12. 
 263. Asinof, supra note 92 (stating that some pet owners ―are using life insurance for at least 
part‖ of the funding for a pet care arrangement). Kansas State University‘s Perpetual Pet Care 
Program specifically permits funding through life insurance. See College of Veterinary Medicine: 
Perpetual Pet Care, KAN. STATE UNIV., http://www.vet.ksu.edu/depts/development/perpet/index. 
htm (last updated Jan. 14, 2009). 
 264. See infra text accompanying note 268 (discussing Texas A&M University‘s funding 
requirements). 
 265. For extended summaries of animal care organizations, see CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, 
supra note 72, at 91–123; HOYT, supra note 253, at 127–43; LISA ROGAK, PERPETUAL CARE: WHO 
WILL LOOK AFTER YOUR PETS IF YOU‘RE NOT AROUND? 25–35, 67–77 (2003). 
 266. The Center‘s Web site appears at: Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center: Texas 
A&M Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, TEX. A&M UNIV., 
http://www.cvm.tamu.edu/petcare/petcare.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 267. Karen Lee Stevens, „Til Death Do Us Part, CAT WATCH, Apr. 2008, at 10, 11. 
 268. Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center: Minimum Required Endowment, TEX. 
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owners can secure their pets a future home, personal ―wellness‖ program, 
special diet, bathing, grooming, daily exercise (complete with ―frisbies, 
rope tugs, balls and an array of toys to keep the [animals] and staff 
occupied and happy‖),269 and round-the-clock companionship and care 
from Texas A&M students.
270
 
 Unfortunately, like the ad hoc judicial responses described above, these 
testamentary and nontestamentary approaches also fail to ensure adequate 
protection for a decedent‘s nonhuman loved ones. By focusing on legal 
mechanisms, these approaches reach only a minority of pet owners―those 
with the funds and foresight to consult legal professionals. As Professor 
Gerry Beyer and his co-author Jonathan Wilkerson recently observed, the 
need for ―carefully crafted‖ pet care documents and devices has ―limited 
the ability of many clients, especially those with modest estates, to provide 
for their beloved companions.‖271 Because of the sheer complexity272 of 
these arrangements, even how-to guides for lay pet owners emphasize that 
those individuals should avoid do-it-yourself plans and consult a trained 
legal professional.
273
 Yet, this has turned out to be easier in theory than in 
practice. The pet owner must locate a competent estate planner with 
specific experience in pet care arrangements.
274
 Fraud has been a particular 
problem. Indeed, one author warned her readers that ―there are many 
business and salespeople masquerading as estate planning professionals 
[who] are inundating the public with sales schemes that involve selling 
wills, living trusts and other estate planning documents without the 
involvement of attorneys in the counseling, design and drafting of the 
documents.‖275 
 Another obstacle is psychological. Pet owners must confront their own 
mortality to plan for the care of a pet after their death.
276
 In a recent survey 
                                                                                                                     
A&M UNIV., http://vetmed.tamu.edu/stevenson-center/enrollment/endowment (last visited Mar. 7, 
2011). The endowment can also ―be fully paid-up at the time of enrollment with a considerable 
discount.‖ Id. In that case, there is no enrollment fee and the endowment ranges from $10,000 to 
$100,000. Id. 
 269. Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center: Pet Care, TEX. A&M UNIV., 
http://vetmed.tamu.edu/stevenson-center/pet-care (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).  
 270. Id.; see also Stevens, supra note 267, at 11. 
 271. Gerry W. Beyer & Jonathan P. Wilkerson, Max‟s Taxes: A Tax-Based Analysis of Pet 
Trusts, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1219, 1222 (2009). 
 272. This is particularly true of trusts. See ROGAK, supra note 265, at 60 (referring to the 
―complexity‖ of revocable and testamentary trusts). 
 273. See, e.g., HOYT, supra note 253, at 172 (cautioning pet owners to avoid do-it-yourself 
plans and recommending the use of an estate planning professional). 
 274. See, e.g., ROGAK, supra note 265, at 38–40 (advising selection of ―pet-savvy estate-
planning experts‖). 
 275. HOYT, supra note 253, at 168. 
 276. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 263 (stating that decedents may ―fail to write 
wills due to [the] . . . inability to confront their own mortality‖); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in 
Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1049 (2004) 
(discussing ―[e]state planners‘ . . . uphill struggle to get clients actually to present themselves in a 
law office—where, of course, they would directly confront their mortality‖); Stevens, supra note 
267, at 11 (―Preparing a will that includes arrangements for your cat is vital, but many owners resist 
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of older Americans, 20% of the respondents stated that ―‗[t]hinking about 
my own death . . . scares me.‘‖277 Perhaps not surprisingly, only half of 
American decedents die with a will.
278
 
 In addition, will provisions for pets―no matter how well 
drafted―have a potentially fatal flaw for a decedent‘s nonhuman loved 
ones. The decedent‘s directives do not become legally effective until the 
will has been formally probated.
279
 The probate process may take weeks, 
months, or even years to complete.
280
 The delay may ―mean the difference 
between life and death‖281 for the pets the decedent hoped to protect. 
 A 1957 California case provides a cautionary tale.
282
 In 1944, silent-
film cowboy star William S. Hart executed a will, which intentionally 
omitted his son
283
 and left his villa and 220-acre Horseshoe Ranch to Los 
Angeles County for a public park.
284
 Hart‘s will further provided: ―All the 
domestic animals which I may own at the time of my death shall be 
allowed to spend their remaining days in the Park and shall be properly fed 
and cared for at all times by the County.‖285 In 1946, Hart died and his son 
contested the will.
286
 After over a decade of litigation,
287
 the estate finally 
                                                                                                                     
taking this important step [because] ‗[p]eople don‘t want to think about what will happen if they 
die . . . .‘‖ (quoting Christine Belezza, a consultant with the Feline Health Center at Cornell 
University‘s College of Veterinary Medicine)). 
 277. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 87, at 71 (quoting 2006 AARP Thoughts on the 
Afterlife Survey). 
 278. Id. (stating that ―roughly half the population dies intestate‖). 
 279. COLGATE, supra note 256, at 32 (―The instructions you put in your Will are not carried 
out automatically. When you are gone there is a lengthy and formal process that must be followed in 
each state to probate a Will.‖); Robert E. Blizard et al., Helping Clients Provide for Pets in Their 
Estate Plans, PROB. & PROP., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 52, 54 (noting that because of delays in probate 
and ―final settlement of property . . . . it may take a long time for instructions regarding the pets‘ 
long-term care to be carried out‖). 
 280. Bambi Glenn, Estate Planning for Your Pets, MD. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 23, 25 
(discussing delays in the probate process). 
 281. ROGAK, supra note 265, at 46; see also SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 21–22 
(discussing the potential ―bad outcome‖ for pets). This is the principal reason commentators 
recommend use of a revocable inter vivos trust for care of a pet. See, e.g., CONGALTON & 
ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 82 (―The primary advantage of a [revocable] trust is that it 
circumvents the delay between your death and the probating of your will. . . . [and] your caretaker 
has immediate access to any funds required for the safety and well-being of your animals.‖). Wills 
have other disadvantages. For example, ―[w]ills . . . are public record, available to beneficiaries, 
heirs, thieves, reporters, and ‗inquiring minds‘ alike.‖ Foster, supra note 18, at 557. Decedents may 
wish to keep provisions for care of pets, especially if the provisions are substantial, private so that 
family members do not contest the will on mental capacity grounds. For a discussion of the 
―public/private distinction‖ between wills and revocable trusts, see id. at 559–66. 
 282. In re Estate of Hart, 311 P.2d 605 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
 283. Last Will and Testament of William S. Hart art. SECOND (Sept. 9, 1944) [hereinafter 
Hart Will] (on file with the author). 
 284. Id. at art. FOURTH; see also Myrna Oliver, Obituaries; William S. Hart Jr., 81; Only Son 
of Famed Silent Film Cowboy, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at B10 (describing Hart‘s will).  
 285. Hart Will, supra note 283, at art. FOURTH.L. 
 286. Estate of Hart, 311 P.2d at 607. 
 287. Id. at 614 (―After nearly ten years of litigation . . . the final accounting and petition for 
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was closed and Hart‘s animals were free to spend their remaining years as 
Hart had directed. Unfortunately, by that time, few if any animals were still 
alive. According to the District Court of Appeal‘s 1957 opinion, as of 
―January 10, 1955, there were then surviving two dogs, one burro, one 
mare, and six horses. How many of these animals have since passed away 
we are not advised.‖288 
 Contractual arrangements, too, have put decedents‘ pets at risk. After a 
decedent‘s death, even the most well-intentioned lifetime care provider 
may experience financial difficulties and be unable to give pets the level of 
care the decedent expected.
289
 Some organizations go out of business 
altogether and leave pets homeless.
290
 
 At worst, a facility may become a house of horrors. For example, in 
2005, a Texas couple agreed to close their pet retirement center to avoid 
prosecution for animal cruelty and fraud.
291
 When sheriff‘s deputies and 
staff from the Texas Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
raided the center, they found over 200 cats living in ―cramped conditions 
amid feces and flies.‖292 Some facilities that promise ―perpetual‖ animal 
care condemn pets to an even more horrific fate. As Florida attorney Peggy 
Hoyt reports, such ―facilities have been targeted by medical research 
organizations involved in various cruelty industries as an easy, low-cost 
source of research animals.‖293 Thus, if the decedent makes the wrong 
choice of contractual partner, beloved pets could end up subjects of a 
research project.
294
 
                                                                                                                     
distribution was filed on January 10, 1955 . . . .‖). Hart‘s son appealed this judgment as well and the 
case did not end until 1957 when the district court of appeal affirmed the superior court‘s judgment 
settling Hart‘s estate, id., and the Supreme Court denied the son‘s petition for a hearing.  
 288. Id. 
 289. See CONGALTON & ALEXANDER, supra note 72, at 121 (reporting that ―Nancy Peterson of 
The Humane Society of the United States . . . is wary of what she calls ‗Mom and Pop places,‘ 
retirement centers operating purely on the goodness of the human heart, but not always blessed with 
the financial know-how to survive‖); Zeke MacCormack, Animal Neglect Case; 200 Cats Seized 
Near Comfort, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 28, 2005, at 1B (reporting that the owner of a pet 
retirement home ―confirmed that financial hardships had delayed needed repairs‖). 
 290. Casteel, supra note 251, at 9 (―The client should beware of for-profit retirement homes 
because they could go out of business if not sufficiently profitable.‖). Financial issues are not the 
only potential problem. See Andrew Tran, Providing for Pooch, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 9, 2008, at 
D1 (―[Pet retirement home operators] have a good heart and want to do good things, but what‘s 
going to happen to the animals if these people get hurt or ill?‖). 
 291. Zeke MacCormack, Comfort Couple Agree to Give Up 202 of Their Cats, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 6, 2005, at 1B (―A Comfort area couple agreed Friday to close their pet 
retirement home and forfeit 202 seized cats to avoid possible prosecution on animal cruelty 
charges.‖); see also MacCormack, supra note 289 (―‗We do definitely have animal cruelty, and 
possibly have fraud‘ . . . .‖ (quoting a sheriff‘s department investigator)). Officials emphasized that 
―[c]onditions at the facility didn‘t live up to those portrayed on its Web site.‖ Id. 
 292. MacCormack, supra note 291.  
 293. HOYT, supra note 253, at 130. 
 294. Id. (―I can think of few things sadder than a family pet becoming part of any kind of 
research project.‖). 
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2.  Legislative Reforms 
 In forty-five states and the District of Columbia,
295
 legislators have 
enacted so-called ―pet trust‖296 laws to respond to their constituents‘ desire 
to provide for nonhuman loved ones.
297
 Like estate planners, legislative 
reformers have focused on legal mechanisms decedents can use to protect 
pets and avoid family paradigm-based rules of inheritance. They too have 
identified and addressed long-standing obstacles to judicial enforcement of 
pet care arrangements. These reformers‘ approach is different, however. 
Rather than working within or bypassing traditional restrictions, they have 
attacked those restrictions. Specifically, legislators across the country have 
liberalized the requirements for the most popular pet care 
mechanism―trusts. In the process, they have addressed the three greatest 
threats to decedents‘ efforts to provide for nonhuman survivors: (1) the 
rule against perpetuities; (2) the prohibition against animals as 
beneficiaries; and (3) drafting errors. 
a.  Rule Against Perpetuities 
 Nearly all pet trust laws have reduced or eliminated rule against 
perpetuities restrictions. Some statutes continue to ―pay[] homage‖298 to 
the rule but relax the requirements to encompass pet trusts. For example, 
Oklahoma‘s new legislation rescues trusts for the benefit of animals by 
allowing a human caretaker or remainder beneficiary to serve as a 
measuring life for rule against perpetuities purposes.
299
 Similarly, New 
Jersey law has dispensed with the measuring life requirement but still 
limits the duration of pet trusts to twenty-one years.
300
 Thus, in New 
Jersey, pet trusts are no longer automatically invalid but instead ―terminate 
when no living animal is covered by the trust, or at the end of 21 years, 
whichever occurs earlier.‖301 
 Most pet trust laws have gone still further and exempted pet trusts from 
the rule against perpetuities. For instance, Maryland‘s 2009 law expressly 
                                                                                                                     
 295. For a list of pet trust laws, see SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 144–80. Since 
attorney Barry Seltzer and Professor Gerry Beyer compiled their list, three more states have enacted 
pet trust laws―Georgia, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28 (West 2010); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 203, § 3C (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 199 (West 2010). 
 296. These statutes may encompass animals other than pets. For example, Oregon‘s statutory 
provision is entitled ―pet trust.‖ OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.185 (West 2010). However, the official 
comment to this provision defines ―the so-called ‗pet trust‘‖ as a ―trust for the care of an animal, 
including exotic, domestic, and pet animals.‖ The Oregon Uniform Trust Code and Comments, 42 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 257 (2006) (reproducing the comment). 
 297. For example, the ―inspiration‖ behind Connecticut‘s 2009 statute was Eleanor Linkkila, a 
retired University of Connecticut administrative assistant who contacted her state representative 
after she discovered she could not create an enforceable trust for her two cats. MariAn Gail Brown, 
Where There‟s a Will, There May Be a Pet Trust, CONN. POST ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2009. 
 298. Beyer, supra note 78, at 652. 
 299. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 199(G) (West 2010). 
 300. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:11-38(a) (West 2011). 
 301. Id. 
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states that ―the common-law rule against perpetuities . . . does not apply to 
. . . [a] trust created . . . to provide for the care of an animal alive during the 
lifetime of the settlor.‖302 On May 5, 2010, one of the last holdouts―New 
York―joined this reform movement. The legislature amended the law to 
―eliminat[e] the 21-year limit for the duration of pet trusts.‖303 Today, New 
Yorkers can ensure lifelong care for even their longest-lived horses, 
parrots, or tortoises.
304
 
b.  Animals as Beneficiaries 
 Pet trust laws have abolished another rule courts have used to 
invalidate pet care arrangements―the rule that animals cannot be 
beneficiaries of trusts. In the forty-six jurisdictions that have enacted such 
laws, individuals can establish trusts for nonhuman as well as human loved 
ones. Indeed, the Delaware statute specifically provides that a trust for the 
care of animals ―shall not be invalid because it lacks an identifiable person 
as beneficiary.‖305 
 Legislative reformers have also addressed a related problem for trusts 
that have animals as beneficiaries―the lack of a ―legal person‖ to enforce 
the trust. For example, in Arizona, like other states that have adopted the 
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) model,
306
 a pet trust can be enforced by a 
person either designated in the trust instrument or, if none, appointed by 
the court.
307
 Other states have followed the lead of the Uniform Trust Code 
drafters
308
 and enlarged the category of potential enforcers to include ―[a] 
person having an interest in the welfare of the animal . . . .‖309 California 
has the most expansive scheme of all, even allowing a ―nonprofit 
charitable corporation that has as its principal activity the care of 
animals . . . [to] inspect the animal, the premises where the animal is 
maintained, or the books and records of the trust.‖310 
c.  Drafting Errors 
 Finally, some legislative reformers have tackled the problem that has 
particularly plagued laypersons‘ pet care arrangements―drafting errors. 
Indeed, a Detroit attorney has asserted that one of the principal goals of his 
                                                                                                                     
 302. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(b), (b)(12) (West 2010). 
 303. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7–8.1(a) (McKinney 2004), amended by 2010 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws ch. 70 (McKinney). 
 304. For a list of average lifespan of animals, see SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 133–36. 
The average lifespan of horses is forty years and of parrots is up to eighty years. Id. at 134–35. 
―[T]ortoises have been known to live for over 150 years.‖ WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 
87, at 587. 
 305. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3555(b) (West 2010). 
 306. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(4) (amended 1993). 
 307. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2907(C)(4) (2010). 
 308. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(b) (amended 2005). 
 309. Id. For an example of a statute adopting this language, see ALA. CODE § 19-3B-408 
(2010). 
 310. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212(f) (West 2009). 
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state‘s legislation ―is to bring poorly-drafted bequests under the pet trust 
statute.‖311 
 UPC drafters―and those like the Michigan legislators312 who followed 
their example―have introduced three important reforms to extend 
protection to even the most inartfully drafted pet care arrangements. First, 
they have called for liberal rules of construction.
313
 This includes reversing 
the traditional judicial presumption that such dispositions are ―merely 
precatory or honorary.‖314 Second, they have made the pet owner‘s intent 
rather than the written expression of that intent determinative.
315
 In fact, 
the UPC statutes provide that ―[e]xtrinsic evidence is admissible in 
determining the transferor‘s intent.‖316 Third, and most remarkably, these 
reformers extend protection of the ―pet trust‖317 statute not only to trusts 
but also to other dispositive instruments providing care for animals.
318
 The 
end result is a scheme that ―increase[s] the likelihood that the pet owner‘s 
intent will be effectuated‖319 and that her nonhuman survivors will receive 
the care she expected. 
d.  Limitations 
 Proponents claim pet trust laws give people ―peace of mind knowing 
their animals will be properly cared for if owners die before their pets.‖320 
However, these promising legislative reforms offer uncertain protection for 
decedents‘ pets. In some states, individuals cannot even die with 
confidence that their nonhuman loved ones will actually qualify as trust 
beneficiaries. Consider, for instance, the Illinois statute‘s321 ambiguous 
language. Illinois law permits ―[a] trust for the care of one or more 
                                                                                                                     
 311. Eric Thomas Carver, Pet Trusts: Estate and Tax Planning Considerations Under 
Michigan Law, 33 MICH. TAX LAW. 32, 32 (2007). 
 312. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722(2) (West 2010) (adopting Uniform Probate Code 
language). 
 313. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b) (amended 1993) (―A governing instrument must be 
liberally construed to bring the transfer within this subsection . . . .‖). 
 314. Id. (stating that the instrument must be construed ―to presume against the merely 
precatory or honorary nature of the disposition‖). 
 315. Id. (stating that the instrument must be construed ―to carry out the general intent of the 
transferor‖). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. (titling the subsection ―Trust for Pets‖). 
 318. The subsection refers to ―[a] governing instrument.‖ Id. ―Governing instrument‖ is 
defined earlier in the Uniform Probate Code to include not only a trust but a broad array of 
―dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument[s] of any similar type.‖ Id. § 1–201(18). 
 319. Beyer, supra note 78, at 653. 
 320. Press Release, Office of Gov. M. Jodi Rell, Governor Rell: October 1 Law Allows Pet 
Owners to Set Up Trusts for Animals (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view. 
asp?A=3675&Q=448000&pp+12&n=1 (reporting Connecticut Governor M. Jodi Rell‘s 
announcement after she signed Connecticut‘s first pet trust law); see also Emily Gardner, An Ode to 
Roxy Russell: A Look at Hawaii‟s New Pet Trust Law, HAW. B. J., Apr. 2007, at 30, 33 (stating that 
because of the new Hawaii pet trust law ―[p]eople can now have the peace of mind that comes from 
knowing that their beloved family member(s) will be properly cared for after their death‖). 
 321. 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/15.2 (West 2010). 
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designated domestic or pet animals.‖322 Suppose an Illinois resident creates 
a trust for ―all the pet animals that I own at my death.‖323 Would that meet 
the requirement of ―designated‖ animals? What about a trust for ―my cat 
Beijing and any offspring born to her while the trust is enforceable‖?324 
Does the term ―designated‖ cover Beijing‘s kittens? Similarly, which 
Illinois animals constitute ―domestic or pet animals‖? Does an alligator or 
a Savannah (a wild/domestic hybrid cat)
325
 qualify? As a New Jersey 
lawyer observed, ―Some people domesticate the darnd-est things.‖326 Not 
surprisingly, most jurisdictions have rejected the ―domestic or pet‖ 
limitation. Thus, unlike their Illinois counterparts, Delaware residents can 
establish a trust for ―any nonhuman member of the animal kingdom 
but . . . [not] plants and inanimate objects.‖327 
 Moreover, nearly every pet trust statute denies decedents the ultimate 
control over their pets‘ standard of living. These laws give courts or, in 
North Carolina,
328
 court clerks the discretion to decide whether the 
amounts decedents allocated for the care of their nonhuman loved ones are 
―excessive.‖329 As a result, after a decedent‘s death, outsiders can reduce 
trust funds to fit their own notions of ―reasonable‖ expenditures on pets.330 
 In addition, individuals cannot rely on a pet trust statute to be a ―fool-
proof mechanism for guaranteeing a bequest to an animal is valid.‖331 
                                                                                                                     
 322. Id. This language is nearly identical to that used in the Uniform Probate Code. UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2–907(b) (amended 1993) (―[A] trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet 
animal is valid.‖). 
 323. I borrow this example from Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and 
Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 941 n.127 (1999). 
 324. This example is a variation of a possible problematic provision suggested by Professor 
William Reppy. Reppy, supra note 118, at 237 (―If the trust is for ten named horses ‗and the 
offspring born to any of the above mares while the trust is enforceable,‘ have the offspring been 
‗designated‘ as the [UPC] statute requires?‖). The inspiration for this example is my parents‘ now 
deceased cat, Beijing, the world‘s fattest, nastiest cat, who fortunately never had any offspring. 
 325. The animals are in fact illegal in some states. See Bradford L. Miner, Stick to the Known 
When Giving Pets; Exotic Species Make Poor Presents, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass.), 
Dec. 9, 2005, at B1 (reporting that alligators and early generations of Savannah cats are illegal in 
Massachusetts). For extended discussion of ―[e]xotic pets prohibited vs. acceptable animals as 
pets,‖ see SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 96–107, 201–04. 
 326. Kris W. Scibiorski, When Your Client‟s a Dog . . . , N.J. LAW., Nov. 5, 2007, at 1 
(quoting Elenora L. Benz). 
 327. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3555(g) (West 2010). 
 328. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-4-408(g) (West 2010). 
 329. The Uniform Probate Code model allows a court to ―reduce the amount of the property 
transferred, if it determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount required‖ for care of 
the animal. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–907(c)(6) (amended 1993). Michigan has adopted this 
approach. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722(3)(f) (West 2010) (using this language). States 
adopting the Uniform Trust Code model remove the word ―substantially.‖ See, e.g., KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 58a-408(c) (2010) (allowing ―the court [to] determine[] that the value of the trust property 
exceeds the amount required for the intended use‖). 
 330. In fact, this is what the New York Surrogate did to Trouble‘s trust. See Toobin, supra 
note 3 (reporting that the surrogate reduced Trouble‘s trust from $12 million to $2 million). 
 331. Taylor, supra note 210, at 436. 
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Although some jurisdictions favor liberal construction of documents,
332
 
most do not. If the document is not properly drafted, the trust will likely 
fail. Pet trust laws effectively ―penalize[ ] those who cannot afford or 
choose not to hire an attorney.‖333 Some jurisdictions only compound the 
problem by establishing further formalities, procedures, administrative 
hurdles, and expenses that the average pet owner could not anticipate.
334
 
For example, even the most pet friendly
335
 statute, Colorado‘s law, requires 
registration of pet trusts and subjects trustees to all of Colorado‘s laws 
regarding trusts and trustees, including filing, accounting, investment, and 
other administrative and fiduciary duties.
336
 
 By far the most serious flaw of the legislative reform approach is lack 
of uniformity. Because of the mobility of modern society, this lack of 
uniformity can defeat ―even the most well-intentioned‖ pet owners‘ efforts 
to provide for their nonhuman loved ones.
337
 For example, if a Connecticut 
resident wanted to create a trust for the lifelong care of his companion of 
twenty years, a parrot named Lucy, he could do so.
338
 If Lucy lived forty 
years after the decedent‘s death, she would continue to be covered by the 
trust. A New Jersey resident, in contrast, could not achieve the same 
objective. He could guarantee Lucy only twenty-one years of care.
339
 If the 
Connecticut resident subsequently moved to Minnesota, a state without a 
                                                                                                                     
 332. See supra Part III.B.2.c. 
 333. Taylor, supra note 210, at 436. 
 334. Some statutes specifically exempt pet trusts, especially small trusts, from these 
requirements. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2907(C)(5) (West 2011) (―Except as ordered 
by the court or required by the trust instrument, no filing, report, registration, periodic accounting, 
separate maintenance of funds, appointment or fee is required by reason of the existence of the 
fiduciary relationship of the trustee.‖); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 199(E) (West 2010) (generally 
exempting trusts that do not exceed $20,000 from such requirements). 
 335. Taylor, supra note 210, at 436 (describing Colorado‘s pet trust law as ―the most ‗pro se 
friendly‘‖). 
 336. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-901(3)(e) (West 2010) (―All trusts created under this 
section shall be registered and all trustees shall be subject to the laws of this state applying to trusts 
and trustees.‖). 
 337. Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to 
Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 236 (2003) (―Given the mobility of society, even the 
most well-intentioned testators may be unable to protect their pets if they move to states without 
[pet trust provisions] . . . . [U]ntil there is more uniformity in state law, people will need to be 
careful if they want to ensure that their pets will be able to live in comfort for the remainder of their 
days.‖). Because of this lack of uniformity, practitioners recommend clients ―[c]onsider the 
likelihood of an out-of-state move‖ and take precautions, such as ―a choice of law provision in the 
trust document.‖ Abert, supra note 257, at 22. 
 338. Connecticut law allows a trust to continue until ―the death of the last surviving animal.‖ 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-489a(a) (West 2010). The inspiration for this example is a New 
Jersey parrot named Lucy. The lawyer who drafted a trust for her care reported, ‗―Between you and 
me, she‘s a nasty bird that bites me every chance she gets, but they [the clients] love her.‘‖ Miller, 
supra note 245 (quoting Gary B. Garland). 
 339. See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey‘s twenty-one year 
limitation).  
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pet trust law, Lucy‘s future could be even more precarious.340 The funds 
the decedent thought would assure his beloved companion a long and 
comfortable life could well pass instead to those the family paradigm 
deemed his natural objects―his ―closest‖ human family members.341 
C.  Proposals to Redefine the Legal Status of Pets 
 Finally, reformers have offered another more controversial 
strategy―redefining the legal status of pets, or, as most proponents prefer, 
―companion animals.‖342 In a vast literature that extends well beyond the 
inheritance context,
343
 they have attacked the traditional legal view that 
pets are mere property.
344
 Reformers argue that this view is outdated,
345
 
even ―perverse.‖346 It ignores the special bond between humans and their 
companion animals
347
 and the reality that animals are ―sentient beings‖ 
with feelings and emotions.
348
 In response, reformers have offered three 
                                                                                                                     
 340. If the decedent named Lucy the beneficiary, the trust would be invalid. The trust could 
have been valid if the decedent had named Lucy‘s caregiver as the beneficiary. See Jonathan P. 
Wilkerson, Comment, A “Purr”fect Amendment: Why Congress Should Amend the Internal 
Revenue Code to Apply the Charitable Remainder Exception to Pet Trusts, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
587, 591 & n.38, 592 (2009) (noting that ―traditional trusts,‖ trusts ―in which the beneficiary is a 
person, not a pet,‖ can be used in every state, even those states without pet trust laws). 
 341. This would occur, for example, if the decedent died intestate or funded the pet trust with 
the residue of his estate and provided no alternate residuary beneficiary. 
 342. See supra note 14 (discussing the use of ―companion animal‖). 
 343. A review of this extensive literature is beyond the scope of this Article. For just a 
sampling of relevant works, see generally GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 
(1995); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000); 
ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2004). 
 344. See supra Part II.B.1, 2 (discussing the legal view of pets as property). 
 345. See, e.g., William C. Root, Note, “Man‟s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member? An 
Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages 
Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 446 (2002) (―[T]he law‘s 
characterization of companion animals as property is archaic . . . .‖); Kelly Wilson, Note, Catching 
the Unique Rabbit: Why Pets Should Be Reclassified as Inimitable Property Under the Law, 57 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 167, 195 (2009) (referring to the ―severely outdated concepts of pets as personal 
property‖). 
 346. Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of 
Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 
33, 72 (1998). 
 347. See, e.g., Huss, supra note 337, at 181–85, 192–93, 203 (―[T]he law does not reflect the 
current status of the human-animal bond.‖); Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: 
Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1061–68 (1995) 
(discussing the ―bond between human and companion animal‖). See generally ALAN BECK & 
AARON KATCHER, BETWEEN PETS AND PEOPLE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP (1996); 
COMPANION ANIMALS AND US: EXPLORING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND PETS (Anthony L. 
Podberscek et al. eds., 2000). 
 348. See, e.g., CAROLYN B. MATLACK, WE‘VE GOT FEELINGS TOO!: PRESENTING THE SENTIENT 
PROPERTY SOLUTION xiv (2006) (―Animals are legally our property but unlike the rest of our 
possessions they have feelings! We know they feel pain, distress, love and joy. They are ‗sentient‘ 
40
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main approaches to change the legal status of pets.
349
 
 The first approach envisions a separate, higher property status for 
pets.
350
 For example, author and attorney Carolyn Matlack has proposed a 
new category――sentient property‖351―to recognize that ―animals are 
different from other property like a chair or a piece of luggage. . . . [T]hey 
have feelings.‖352 Rather than challenging the existing classification of pets 
as property, these reformers offer a compromise. They ―tweak‖353 the 
framework to effect an ―‗incremental increase‘‖354 in the legal status of 
pets. As Professor Susan Hankin explained, this scheme ―retains the 
property status of companion animals but accords them a place above 
inanimate property.‖355 
 In contrast, the second approach rejects the very concept of pets as 
property. The reformers in favor of this view argue that the property 
concept is fundamentally inconsistent with the modern societal view of 
pets as family members.
356
 Accordingly, their solution is to ―abrogate‖ the 
property status of pets and, instead, grant those animals full legal 
recognition as family members.
357
 
                                                                                                                     
which is another word for ‗feeling‘.[sic]‖); Wilson, supra note 345, at 183–86 (stating that ―[a] pet 
is a sentient being, capable of feeling pain, fear, aggression, loyalty, and arguably even love‖ and 
discussing the ―unique biological and social traits that pets possess‖). 
 349. This is not meant to suggest that redefining the status of animals, including pets, is the 
only approach proposed. For example, Professor Cass Sunstein has asserted, ―A state could 
dramatically increase enforcement of existing bans on cruelty and neglect without turning animals 
into persons, or making them into something other than property.‖ Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to 
ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 343, at 3, 11. 
 350. See, e.g., MATLACK, supra note 348 (―sentient property‖); Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living 
Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 314, 
379–80, 384–88 (2007) (―companion animal property‖); Wilson, supra note 345, at 192–96 
(―inimitable property‖). A few judges too have expressed a similar view. See, e.g., Bueckner v. 
Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. App. 1994) (Andell, J., concurring) (―Because of the 
characteristics of animals in general and of domestic pets in particular, I consider them to belong to 
a unique category of ‗property‘ . . . .‖). 
 351. She defines sentient property as ―‗any warm-blooded, domesticated, non-human animal 
dependent on one or more human persons for food, shelter, veterinary care, or companionship 
normally kept in or near the household of its owner, guardian or keeper.‘‖ MATLACK, supra note 
348, at 72. 
 352. Id. at 26. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Hankin, supra note 350, at 386 n.316 (quoting April 13, 2004, letter from Carolyn 
Matlack to the Texas Third Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 355. Id. at 320; see also Wilson, supra note 345, at 192, 195 (stating that her scheme, which 
―will entitle pets to a higher status than ordinary personal property,‖ is necessary ―to achieve the 
dual goals of preserving existing framework in the law, while updating severely outdated concepts 
of pets as personal property‖). 
 356. Paek, supra note 68, at 484 (arguing that because ―established legal doctrine classifies 
companion animals as property . . . . , the law fails to reflect society‘s recognition of companion 
animals as family members‖); Root, supra note 345, at 449 (―The law‘s categorization of a 
companion animal as merely property . . . does not accurately reflect societal views [that] . . . pets 
are thought of more as family members than as inanimate objects.‖). 
 357. Paek, supra note 68, at 484, 524 (stating that the ―property classification of all animals 
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 The third approach offers an even more radical response―extending 
legal personhood
358
 to animals. As Professor Steven Wise proclaimed, 
―Without legal personhood, one is invisible to civil law. One has no civil 
rights. One might as well be dead.‖359 Some reformers call for a complete 
jettisoning
360
 of the animals as property paradigm. Professor Gary 
Francione expressed this view best: animals should have ―the right not to 
be property.‖361 These reformers reject anything short of personhood, 
including proposals like those above
362
 that would make animals ―quasi-
persons‖ or ―things plus.‖363 
 Other advocates of this third approach support more limited legal 
personhood. For example, Wise opposes the classification of animals as 
―legal things‖ rather than ―legal persons‖364 but at least initially ―demands 
personhood‖ for only two groups of animals, chimpanzees and bonobos.365 
He acknowledges that certain animals, such as beetles and ants, ―should 
never have these rights.‖366 
 Other reformers, most notably Professor David Favre, argue that 
proposals to abolish the property status of animals are impossible and 
                                                                                                                     
should be completely abrogated‖ so that ―companion animals can finally gain legal recognition as 
family members‖).  
 358. For an outstanding extended discussion of the different definitions of ―personhood‖ in the 
animal rights context, see Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood 
for Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS 
L.J. 247 (2008). 
 359. WISE, supra note 343, at 4. 
 360. Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 
532 (1998) (―[T]he concept of animals as property can and should be jettisoned.‖); see also Lee 
Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, From Property to Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart, 11 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (―Because the property classification treats non-human apes as instruments, 
tools, and toys, their interests can be protected only by reclassifying them as persons.‖). Proponents 
of this view do not demand immediate abolition of the property paradigm. See, e.g., Gary L. 
Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain Without Thunder, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 56–57 (2007) (―We can pursue the incremental eradication of the property 
status―and we can do so now . . . .‖). 
 361. Gary L. Francione, Animals―Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT 
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 343, at 108, 131; see also GARY L. FRANCIONE, 
INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?, at xxxiv (2000) (―I argue that animals 
have only one right―a right not to be treated as property or resources.‖). 
 362. See supra notes 350–55 and accompanying text. 
 363. Francione, supra note 361, at 131. 
 364. WISE, supra note 343, at 4, 267, 270. Wise has written extensively about the historical 
origins of ―legal thinghood‖ for nonhuman animals. See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, The Legal 
Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471 (1996). 
 365. WISE, supra note 343, at 4. He emphasizes, however, that this is only the beginning. Id. at 
268 (―I also never meant to imply that chimpanzees and bonobos are the only nonhuman animals 
who might be entitled to the fundamental legal rights to bodily integrity and bodily 
liberty. . . . Through careful analyses similar to those I have done for chimpanzees and bonobos, we 
can determine the next best candidates [for extension of those rights] . . . .‖). 
 366. Id. at 5. 
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unnecessary.
367
 Favre‘s solution is to bridge the categories of property and 
legal persons.
368
 He presents ―a new paradigm that gives animals the status 
of juristic persons without entirely severing the concept of property 
ownership.‖369 Favre offers as one example of his new paradigm in action 
the relationship of a cat (Zoe) and her human owners (the Willards).
370
 The 
Willards would retain legal title to Zoe, but Zoe would now have what 
Favre calls ―equitable self-ownership.‖371 Because of this split ownership, 
the Willards as legal titleholders would have to ―recognize and take into 
account the interests of the equitable titleholder,‖372 Zoe. Indeed, if the 
Willards mistreated Zoe, she would have the legal right to sue (through a 
human representative) for monetary and perhaps even equitable 
damages.
373
 
 Unfortunately, redefining the legal status of pets―be it as an 
―enhanced type of property,‖374 family members, or legal persons―also 
fails to address the flaws of the inheritance system. The updated property 
definition would differentiate pets from decedents‘ inanimate property and 
would recognize the special bond between decedents and their nonhuman 
loved ones. However, this proposal would actually represent a step 
backwards in the inheritance context. As the previous section has shown, 
recent reforms—especially pet trust legislation—have already moved away 
from the classification of pets as mere property and now permit pets to be 
trust beneficiaries. Indeed, animal law scholars have cited this development 
as a ―conceptual breakthrough‖ that grants animals ―legal personhood for 
purposes of trust enforcement.‖375 
                                                                                                                     
 367. David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87, 90–
91 (2004) [hereinafter Favre, Integrating Animal Interests] (―To seek such abolition [of property 
status] is unwise and unnecessary.‖); David Favre, A New Property Status for Animals: Equitable 
Self-Ownership, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 343, at 
234, 236 [hereinafter Favre, A New Property Status] (―[R]adical change in the short term is 
impossible in our legal system. It would be more realistic to be incremental, to begin the journey of 
change by modifying, but not eliminating, the existing property status of animals.‖). 
 368. Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 367, at 245 (stating that ―[p]resently, the law 
has only two clearly separated categories: property or juristic persons‖ and that his proposed ―new 
paradigm . . . is a blending of the two previously separated categories‖). Favre‘s proposal also 
bridges the ―family‖ category. Id. at 238–39 (arguing that his approach ―shift[s] the nature of the 
relationship between the owner and the animal from that which is like the ownership of the rock to 
that which is more like, but not identical to, the custodial relationship of the human parent and the 
human child‖). 
 369. Id. at 245. 
 370. Id. at 238, 243. 
 371. For extended discussion of this concept, see David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for 
Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473 (2000). 
 372. Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 367, at 241. 
 373. Id. at 243; see also David S. Favre, Judicial Recognition of the Interests of Animals―A 
New Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333, 352–67 (proposing a ―new tort―the intentional interference 
with the primary interests of an animal‖). 
 374. Hankin, supra note 350, at 381. 
 375. Favre, Integrating Animal Interests, supra note 367, at 94. But see Francione, supra note 
360, at 50 (criticizing this view). 
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 The redefinition of pets as family members is also problematic. At first 
glance, the emphasis on family appears to be a promising approach to bring 
pets within protection of the family paradigm of inheritance law. As I have 
argued elsewhere,
376
 however, a reform that defines eligibility in terms of 
family membership raises fundamental questions. What constitutes a 
―family-like‖ relationship between decedents and survivors? Would a 
survivor qualify as one of inheritance law‘s preferred claimants, that is, a 
―child‖ or other close relative?377 What if the decedent defined her survivor 
as her ―best friend and companion‖378 rather than family member? In the 
end, then, a family definition would offer at most a partial solution. It 
would continue to exclude the survivors―nonhuman as well as 
human―the decedent regarded as her nearest and dearest but not as 
members of her family.
379
 
 Finally, the redefinition of pets as legal persons would also be an 
ineffective response to the flaws of inheritance law. As legal persons, pets 
would simply join the long line of human ―persons‖ the family paradigm 
excludes―unmarried cohabitants, extended and blended family members, 
and nonrelated caregivers, friends, and companions.
380
 Thus, there is only 
one way to ensure that inheritance law no longer defeats decedents‘ wishes 
and leaves their pets unprotected. Reformers must challenge the very 
foundation of inheritance law―the family paradigm‘s narrow definition of 
―natural objects of the decedent‘s bounty.‖ 
IV.  BEYOND THE FAMILY PARADIGM: RECOGNIZING INHERITANCE BY 
PETS AS ―NATURAL‖ 
 The U.S. inheritance system is rooted in the past. It continues to 
privilege membership in a family that is ―rapidly becoming an American 
anachronism.‖381 Because of its outdated focus on the traditional nuclear 
family, inheritance law has failed to recognize what is nothing short of a 
paradigm shift.
382
 As this Part will show, Americans in record numbers are 
                                                                                                                     
 376. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 228–35 (setting out and criticizing reforms to 
redefine the family); Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1364–74 (same). 
 377. According to one commentator, ―[w]hile a pet may be able to become a part of the family, 
it can never attain the same status as a child or human family member.‖ Wilson, supra note 345, at 
186. 
 378. See supra note 82 (citing wills that referred to pets as friends and companions). 
 379. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1374 (making this argument with 
respect to human survivors). 
 380. See supra Part II.A. 
 381. Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of 
Family: Toward a Functional Definition of Family that Protects Children‟s Fundamental Human 
Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 523 (2010). 
 382. P. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE POWERFUL BOND BETWEEN PEOPLE AND PETS: OUR 
BOUNDLESS CONNECTIONS TO COMPANION ANIMALS, at xxi (2008) (referring to a ―distinct paradigm 
shift in the way [Americans] think and feel about‖ pets); PAMELA N. DANZIGER, WHY PEOPLE BUY 
THINGS THEY DON‘T NEED 133 (2004) (stating that ―a paradigm shift [has] occurred in how 
Americans relate to their cats, dogs, and other pets‖ and that pets now are ―valued as companions 
and friends. They have become full-fledged members of the family‖). 
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turning to pets for companionship and affection. Thus, it is time to explore 
new approaches to inheritance that will encompass decedents‘ nonhuman 
and human loved ones. 
A.  Pets and Today‟s American Family 
 According to recent surveys, nearly two-thirds of American households 
have at least one pet.
383
 In contrast, only 35% of households have 
children
384
 and less than one-quarter of households consist of the 
traditional nuclear family unit (married couples with their own children 
under eighteen years old)
385
 so prized by inheritance law‘s family 
paradigm. In the past decade alone, the number of households with pets 
increased by 12%.
386
 Attitudes toward pets have changed just as 
dramatically. Pets have gone ―from worker to companion to family 
member, or even soul mate.‖387 Indeed, many obituaries now include a list 
of the decedent‘s surviving pets as well as human family members.388 
 Study after study has documented that Americans regard their pets as 
their family members, friends, and companions.
389
 For example, a survey 
of 896 military families revealed that 98% of the respondents accorded 
their pets ―full family member[]‖ or ―friend[]‖ status.390 While dog and cat 
owners most often describe their pets as family members and friends,
391
 
                                                                                                                     
 383. See, e.g., Kelly Bothum, Sit, Stay, Now Work Your Magic, NEWS J., Oct. 20, 2009, at 
NaN, available at 2009 WLNR 20820259 (reporting U.S. Census figures); John Woestendiek, A 
Dog‟s Life, BALT. SUN, July 15, 2007, at 1N (reporting APPMA‘s National Pet Owner Survey 
results); see also Press Release, Eureka, Eureka Introduces the Purr-fect Pet Vacuum (July 8, 2008), 
www.prnewswire.com (―[A]ccording to a recent survey by the American Veterinary Medical 
Association[, n]early 60 percent of American households reportedly have pets . . . .‖). 
 384. Press Release, Eureka, supra note 383; see also GRIER, supra note 14, at 315 (stating that 
―36 percent included children‖). 
 385. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES & 
MATERIALS 361 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing U.S. Census statistics). 
 386. Press Release, Am. Pet Prods. Ass‘n, supra note 13. 
 387. Woestendiek, supra note 383. For extended discussion of the historical relationship 
between Americans and their pets, see GRIER, supra note 14. 
 388. See, e.g., Death Notice: Sarah Jane Graham, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2009, at C27 (stating 
that the decedent ―leaves 7 cats, 2 dogs, 2 roosters, 1 fish and 2 frogs‖); Richard, John H., 
HARTFORD COURANT, June 10, 2010, at B10 (stating that the decedent ―will also be greatly missed 
by his favorite truck riding buddy Kaiser, his dog, and cats, Zeus and Samantha‖). 
 389. See Sheila Bonas et al., Pets in the Network of Family Relationships: An Empirical Study, 
in COMPANION ANIMALS AND US, supra note 347, at 209, 212 (listing ―studies which report high 
percentages of people describing pets as family‖); Squires-Lee, supra note 347, at 1065 
(summarizing studies in which 80% of participants described pets as their family members or 
closest friends). 
 390. STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 278 
n.104 (2003) (citing a study by Thomas E. Catanzaro). 
 391. ROD PREECE & LORNA CHAMBERLAIN, ANIMAL WELFARE AND HUMAN VALUES 233 (1993) 
(reporting that in a 1991 survey of ―41 million U.S. dog owners 13 million claimed their attachment 
to their animals as close as that of a best friend, 6.2 million as close as a child and 4.2 as close as a 
spouse‖); Betsy Kerr, Dogs as Family Members and the Level of Attachment in Specific 
Populations, MCNAIR RES. J. 26, 27 (2008–09) (reporting numerous studies showing that ―virtually 
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even reptile owners have expressed similar views. For instance, in its 2007 
National Pet Owners Survey, the American Pet Products Manufacturers 
Association reported that 17% of reptile owners viewed their pets ―like a 
child/family member‖392 and 10% actually bought Christmas gifts for their 
reptiles.
393
 
 In fact, numerous studies indicate that many Americans have a closer 
attachment to their pets than their human family members. For example, in 
a study published in the Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 122 dog 
owners were asked to place symbols for themselves, their dogs, and human 
family members within a circle representing their ―life space.‖394 Thirty-
eight percent placed themselves closer to their dogs than any humans.
395
 In 
a Gallup poll of 885 dog owners, a majority responded that they regard 
their dogs as better companions than their relatives.
396
 Pet Owners Surveys 
by the American Animal Hospital Association have revealed even more 
startling results. One-third of pet owners stated that they spend more time 
with their pets than with family or friends.
397
 In a survey of people who 
took their pets to the hospital, nearly one-half of women responded that 
they rely more on their pets for affection than on their husbands and 
children.
398
 When asked ―If you were deserted on an island and could have 
only one companion, which would you pick?‖ more pet owners chose a 
dog or a cat rather than a human.
399
 
 Experts have identified a number of possible explanations for this 
trend.
400
 These include economic prosperity,
401
 an aging population,
402
 and 
                                                                                                                     
all of the participants saw their dogs as members of the family‖); Ginger Strand, What‟s the Use of 
Pets?, ORION, Sept.–Oct. 2007, http://www.orionmagazine.org (stating that in a 2007 survey by the 
APPMA, 71% of dog owners and 64% of cat owners consider their pet a family member). 
 392. Strand, supra note 391 (reporting statistics). 
 393. Ylan Q. Mui, Ultimate Creature Comforts, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007, at D1 (reporting 
statistics). 
 394. Sandra B. Barker & Randolph T. Barker, The Human-Canine Bond: Closer than Family 
Ties?, 10 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 46, 48 (1988). 
 395. Id. at 52; see also BECK & KATCHER, supra note 347, at 44–45 (describing a similar 
technique and finding that people ―almost always draw their pet closer to themselves than other 
family members‖). 
 396. Kim North, Dogs Collar Equal or More Love than People, Poll Finds, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, May 5, 1998, at 5A. 
 397. Downloads: Pet Sound Bites, BRANDWEEK, Mar. 27, 2000, at 20, available at 2000 
WLNR 9887624 (reporting statistics). 
 398. Gordon Gregory, The Power of Puppy Love, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Apr. 6, 1997, at E01 
(reporting statistics). 
 399. Summary of Results: American Animal Hospital Association 2004 Pet Owner Survey, 
AM. ANIMAL HOSP. ASS‘N, http://www.aahanet.org/media/graphics/petownersurvey2004.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2011) (reporting results from question No. 4 of the survey). 
 400. As historian Katherine Grier has emphasized, ―[n]o single social or cultural factor can 
account for‖ the ―tremendous burst of attention and interest in‖ pet keeping. GRIER, supra note 14, 
at 315; see also Morris B. Holbrook et al., A Collective Stereographic Photo Essay on Key Aspects 
of Animal Companionship: The Truth About Dogs and Cats, ACAD. MARKETING SCI. REV., Jan. 1, 
2001, http://www.amsreview.org/articles/holbrook01-2001.pdf (reporting the results of a study 
identifying the reasons people turn to animal companions). 
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even fashion.
403
 As historian Katherine Grier has remarked, fashion 
―creates fads‖ for certain types of dogs and can turn rare breeds and exotic 
animals into ―ambulatory status symbols.‖404 
 Many authors cite larger societal changes, most notably the breakdown 
of the family.
405
 They emphasize that in a world where ―[f]amily ties may 
be tenuous, fragile, or nonexistent,‖406 Americans are turning to pets to fill 
the void.
407
 
 Similarly, commentators have focused on ―the disintegration of 
communities.‖408 They argue that with increased social mobility, 
―[n]eighborhoods where families live for generations, sharing history, 
culture, and social activities are rare.‖409 Technology may only have 
exacerbated the problem. As author P. Elizabeth Anderson observed, ―[a] 
quick phone call here or an e-mail there does not a relationship sustain. 
Our social contacts are characterized by the Internet, iPods, Blackberries, 
cell phones, or television.‖410 As a result, pets are now providing the 
companionship, support, and ―buffer against loneliness‖411 once found with 
friends and neighbors. 
 Finally, several scholars have pointed to the stresses of modern 
American society and culture, such as constant change, chaos, fear, 
materialism, and alienation.
412
 Professor Alan Beck and his co-author 
                                                                                                                     
 401. GRIER, supra note 14, at 316–18; Huss, supra note 337, at 194 (citing the ―affluence and 
materialistic values in U.S. society‖). 
 402. Experts argue that the aging of the baby boomer generation in particular may have an 
impact on the increased interest in pets. See, e.g., Woestendiek, supra note 383 (quoting an 
organization as stating ―‗[a]s more baby boomers become empty-nesters, they will seek to fill the 
vacuum left by their departed children with the four-legged variety . . .‘‖). 
 403. GRIER, supra note 14, at 318–19. 
 404. Id. at 318. 
 405. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 398 (referring to the ―swelling divorce rates [and] 
increasing numbers of single-parent families‖); Tamina Toray, The Human-Animal Bond and Loss: 
Providing Support for Grieving Clients, 26 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 244, 244 (2004) 
(―Changes in the family structure and mobility in society have created an accompanying increase in 
the importance of social roles that pets play in people‘s lives.‖). 
 406. DIANE POMERANCE, PET PARENTHOOD 4 (2007). 
 407. William Hathaway, People, Pets and Vets, HARTFORD COURANT, June 1, 1997, at A1; 
Robin Stansbury, At Your Service, Pooch, HARTFORD COURANT, July 26, 1999, at A1. Sandra 
Barker, director of the Center for Human-Animal Interaction, suggests that one reason people may 
be closer to their pets than their human family members is that as ―‗families have become more 
separated,‘ . . . . ‗[P]ets are providing that form of social support that years ago we‘d get from that 
family member living close by.‘‖ Pet Door to HEAVEN, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2007, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-04-19/news/0704190627_1_pet-owners-center-for-human-
animal-interaction-memorials (quoting Sandra Barker). 
 408. Gregory, supra note 398. 
 409. ANDERSON, supra note 382, at xxii. 
 410. Id. at xxi; POMERANCE, supra note 406, at 6 (―[In an] increasingly technological, and 
impersonal world in which so many of us feel isolated, disconnected, or detached from one another, 
an animal companion provides us with love, affection, devotion and loyalty.‖). 
 411. Gregory, supra note 398 (referring to the findings of then-associate director of the Center 
for Animals and Society Lee Zasloff‘s ―research with single women‖). 
 412. For discussion of these stresses, see BECK & KATCHER, supra note 347, at 26–29. 
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Aaron Katcher put it best: ―[P]ets offer a bulwark of stability‖413 and 
―protective armor against much of the pain of living.‖414 Pets may even 
serve as an antidote to urbanization. As Lee Zasloff, associate director of 
the University of California at Davis Center for Animals and Society, 
noted, ―‗Pets [can] provide links to nature that are increasingly hard to 
touch in this technological and urbanizing culture . . . .‘‖415 
 Although experts find different explanations persuasive, they all agree 
on one point. The human-animal bond is ―powerful‖416 and only likely to 
grow stronger in the future.
417
 Thus, it is time for inheritance law to 
abandon the abstract family categories of the past and recognize that the 
bond between Americans and their pets may well transcend death. 
B.  Implications for Inheritance Law 
 In earlier work, I advocated recognition that inheritance involves real 
people rather than abstractions.
418
 I argued that reformers should look 
beyond the rigid, status-based family paradigm for more flexible, 
individualized schemes of inheritance.
419
 I found two approaches most 
promising―what I called the decedent intent approach and the actual 
relationship approach.
420
 I showed that both approaches are already reality 
in a related context.
421
 For over a century, courts have applied the decedent 
intent approach and the actual relationship approach in resolving disputes 
over disposition of a decedent‘s remains.422 
                                                                                                                     
 413. Id. at 27. 
 414. Id. at xiv. 
 415. Gregory, supra note 398 (quoting Lee Zasloff); see also Holbrook et al., supra note 400, 
at 5 (reporting that some participants in their study stated that ―their pets provide them an 
opportunity more fully to appreciate Nature in general or to experience ‗wildlife‘ in particular via a 
daily contact with members of another species‖). 
 416. ANDERSON, supra note 382 (including in her book‘s title ―The Powerful Bond Between 
Pets and People‖); Woestendiek, supra note 383 (referring to the ―powerful bond‖). Indeed, clinical 
hypnotherapist Marjorie Padorr argues that ―the human-pet bond can form faster and ultimately be 
stronger than the human-human bond . . . . ‗It‘s the strongest bond since time immemorial.‘‖ Leo 
Smith, „90s Family, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1995, at E3 (quoting Marjorie Padorr). 
 417. Janice M. Pintar, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fair 
Market Value Approach in Wisconsin: The Case for Extending Tort Protection to Companion 
Animals and Their Owners, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 735, 766 (―[R]esearch has shown that the strength of 
the human-animal bond is increasing.‖). 
 418. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 199, 200–01; Foster, Individualized Justice, 
supra note 16, at 1399; see also Jane B. Baron, Essay, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 
DUKE L.J. 630, 664 (1992) (―Real people, not abstractions, write wills . . . .‖). 
 419. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 251–71; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra 
note 16, at 1385–99. 
 420. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 257–71. In a recent article, Professor Lee-ford 
Tritt has made a persuasive case for the decedent intent approach. According to Tritt, ―the default 
rules that govern succession law should correspond and be in line regardless of whether the 
decedent dies intestate or testate. The decedent‘s intent should control.‖ Tritt, supra note 46, at 
278–79. 
 421. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1385–99. 
 422. Id. 
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 The decedent intent approach would give real content to the cherished 
American ideal of ―[d]onative freedom.‖423 Rather than implementing 
traditional family-based definitions of ―natural objects of the decedent‘s 
bounty,‖ this approach would extend inheritance rights to the survivors 
decedents themselves defined as their natural objects―family and 
nonfamily alike.
424
 The decedent intent approach ―would consider the full 
range of decedents‘ expressions of their dispositive preferences, from 
formally executed wills to oral statements of intent.‖425 
 The actual relationship approach would focus on an individual 
decedent‘s lifetime relationships with survivors.426 It would consider such 
relationships as those ―involving support, financial sharing, legal 
obligations or decisionmaking authority for the other party, or a decedent‘s 
attitude of generosity toward a person or organization that would likely 
have continued had death not intervened.‖427  
 This Article confirms the wisdom of exploring new directions for 
inheritance law. It demonstrates that in the real world the family paradigm 
imposes significant costs on decedents and their survivors.
428
 The 
remainder of this Article explores how two more flexible, individualized 
schemes―the decedent intent approach and the actual relationship 
approach
429―might better meet the needs of today‘s American decedents 
and their nonhuman loved ones. 
1.  The Decedent Intent Approach 
 The decedent intent approach would have a single objective: to identify 
and effectuate an individual‘s plans for her nonhuman as well as human 
survivors. Accordingly, this approach would give utmost respect to validly 
executed written instruments
430―be they wills or will substitutes―that 
clearly express a decedent‘s wishes to provide for her pets. The result 
would be a significant change in mental capacity doctrines and rules.
431
 
Provisions for pets, even those at the expense of an individual‘s closest 
human family members, would no longer create a presumption that the 
                                                                                                                     
 423. Id. at 1388; see also Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 258. 
 424. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 257; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra 
note 16, at 1387–88. 
 425. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1388.  
 426. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 268; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra 
note 16, at 1388. 
 427. Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1388 (internal quotation marks and 
external citation omitted); see also Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 269–70. 
 428. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 240–51 (identifying the human costs of 
the family paradigm). 
 429. Although these two approaches will be discussed separately, in fact a court can apply both 
to determine the most appropriate disposition of a decedent‘s estate. See Foster, Individualized 
Justice, supra note 16, at 1397–98 (discussing a mortal remains case in which a court applied both 
the decedent intent approach and the actual relationship approach). 
 430. For extended discussion of the decedent intent approach‘s treatment of validly executed 
written instruments, see Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 258. 
 431. See id. (setting out changes in mental capacity doctrines and rules). 
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decedent lacked mental capacity.
432
 Under the decedent intent approach, 
the ―unnatural disposition‖ would effectively become ―natural.‖ Mental 
capacity doctrines would now focus solely on protection of the decedent. 
Protection of family survivors would be irrelevant. Thus, a court would 
enforce a validly executed testamentary or nontestamentary provision for a 
pet except in the rare case where strong evidence exists that the provision 
did not in fact represent the decedent‘s true desires due to senility, fraud, 
duress, undue influence, and the like.  
 The decedent intent approach would go still further. Because its 
principal concern would be intent rather than formalities, this approach 
would extend protection to written instruments that clearly expressed an 
individual‘s desire to provide for her pets but failed to meet execution 
requirements.
433
 In so doing, it would address a significant problem 
identified above.
434
 As case after case has demonstrated, legal formalities 
have been a trap for the unwary, especially lay, pet owner. Even the most 
minor deviations from execution requirements have frustrated pet owners‘ 
intent and doomed their pets to an uncertain future. In contrast, under the 
decedent intent approach, a misplaced signature or scratched-out will 
provision would not prevent a decedent‘s nonhuman loved ones, like Mary 
Tyrrell‘s ―pets‖435 or Beatrice Katz‘s ―feline friend,‖436 from inheriting. 
 The decedent intent approach would also respond to a related problem 
that has defeated individuals‘ efforts to provide for their pets: drafting 
errors.
437
 As Part III has shown, precedent already exists for this reform. 
UPC drafters and legislators who have followed their example have 
adopted pet trust statutes that explicitly make a pet owner‘s actual intent 
rather than the specific written expression of that intent determinative. 
These statutes provide for liberal construction of pet care provisions ―to 
bring the transfer within [the pet trust statute] . . . and to carry out the 
general intent of the transferor.‖438 The statutes even permit the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence to ascertain that intent.
439
  
The UPC model has two potential limitations on decedent intent, 
however. First, the UPC statute could be interpreted to apply only to 
dispositive instruments decedents intended as ―trusts‖ for their pets. Thus, 
it might not encompass a document like a poorly drafted contract to 
devise.
440
 Second, the statute subjects a pet care provision that qualifies as 
                                                                                                                     
 432. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 433. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 260–62 (discussing changes in will 
execution requirements). 
 434. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 435. See supra notes 193–202 and accompanying text (discussing Estate of Tyrrell). 
 436. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text (discussing Katz‘s failed effort to provide 
for her cat). 
 437. See supra notes 271–75 and accompanying text. For extended discussion of how the 
decedent intent approach could change construction and interpretation rules, see Foster, Family 
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 258–60. 
 438. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–907(b) (amended 2006). 
 439. Id. 
 440. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing contracts to devise). 
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a ―trust for pets‖ to statutory requirements that may directly contradict a 
pet owner‘s intent. One notable example is the provision that gives courts 
the authority to reduce pet trust funds that ―substantially exceed[] the 
amount required for the intended use.‖441 The decedent intent approach 
would remove both restrictions. It would extend liberal construction rules 
to all written pet care arrangements regardless of whether those 
arrangements were intended as trusts or even resembled trusts. Moreover, 
this approach would allow individuals to devise their own plans for care of 
their pets rather than imposing legislative notions of an appropriate 
scheme. 
 The decedent intent approach would even consider oral expressions of 
intent to provide for pets.
442
 At first glance, this appears to be a radical 
proposal. In fact, however, one state―Oregon―has already moved in this 
direction. Oregon‘s pet trust statute provides: ―An oral or written 
declaration shall be liberally construed in favor of finding the creation of a 
trust under this section.‖443 The decedent intent approach would take the 
next step. It would allow courts to go beyond the trust context and uphold 
oral statements of a decedent‘s wishes regarding care of her pets if clear 
and convincing evidence of those wishes existed.
444
 The decedent intent 
approach could even follow the lead of courts in mortal remains cases and 
consider not only any written or oral declaration of intent but also an 
individual decedent‘s ―acts, state of mind, . . . and ‗intensity of . . . 
feelings.‘‖445 
 It should be noted, however, that the decedent intent approach would 
not honor all pet owner directives. A 1964 Pennsylvania case
446
 provides a 
prime illustration of such a directive. In 1963, Ida Capers died, survived by 
the two ―chief objects of [her] affection,‖ her Irish setters, Brickland and 
Sunny Birch.
447
 Out of fear that her two companions ―would grieve for her 
or that no one would afford them the same affection and kindness that they 
received during her life,‖448 Capers included in her will a provision 
ordering her executors to destroy her dogs ―‗in a humane manner.‘‖449 
Fortunately for Brickland and Sunny Birch, the executors did not comply 
with this directive and instead filed a petition for declaratory judgment. 
The court held that the provision was void against public policy, stating ―to 
destroy these two Irish setters that have displayed nothing but fidelity and 
affection, would be an act of gross inhumanity.‖450 
                                                                                                                     
 441. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–907(c)(6) (amended 2006); see also supra notes 328–36 
(criticizing pet trust statutory requirements). 
 442. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1379 (discussing this approach in 
mortal remains cases). 
 443. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.185(1) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
 444. See Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1391 (discussing this approach). 
 445. Id. at 1392–93 (quoting Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 1926)). 
 446. Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (Orphans‘ Ct. 1964). 
 447. Id. at 121, 126. 
 448. Id. at 126. 
 449. Id. at 122 (quoting will provision). 
 450. Id. at 133–34. Interestingly, the court applied the decedent intent approach. After 
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2.  The Actual Relationship Approach 
 The actual relationship approach too would look beyond the family 
paradigm for a more flexible, individualized approach to inheritance. 
Rather than basing inheritance rights on the traditional status-based 
definition of ―natural objects,‖ this approach would focus on the particular 
relationships of a decedent with others―nonhuman as well as human―in 
the decedent‘s life.451 Interestingly, in the pet context, proponents of this 
approach would have a vast literature from which to draw inspiration. In 
recent work, scholars, practitioners, and animal rights advocates have 
written extensively about the importance of the human-animal bond in 
American society today.
452
 They have called for legal reforms, especially in 
the areas of custody disputes over pets
453
 and recovery for the tortious 
death of a pet,
454
 that would recognize the ―uniqueness and strength of 
[that] bond.‖455 
 This literature is directly relevant to the actual relationship approach to 
inheritance. Specifically, just as in the inheritance context, authors have 
emphasized the need to examine the ―individualized‖456 relationship 
between a pet owner and a pet. Moreover, they have identified a number of 
factors that courts could use in inheritance cases to evaluate the ―depth of 
the relationship‖457 between decedent and pet. These factors fall into four 
broad categories. 
 First, courts could examine the ―duration and continuity‖458 of the 
relationship, including the frequency of contact and interaction between a 
                                                                                                                     
examining evidence of Capers‘ extraordinary love, affection, and treatment of her dogs, the court 
concluded that the will did not express her actual intent. See id. at 129–30 (stating that Capers 
―would rather see her pets happy and healthy and alive than destroyed‖). For extended discussion of 
testamentary directives to destroy pets, see generally Frances Carlisle, Destruction of Pets by Will 
Provision, 16 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 894 (1981); Reppy, supra note 118, at 219–25; Abigail J. 
Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of 
Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. L. REV. 911, 930–34, 939–43 (2001). 
 451. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 16, at 268–70; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra 
note 16, at 1388, 1393–98.  
 452. See supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
 453. See, e.g., Huss, supra note 337; Lacy L. Shuffield, Pet Parents―Fighting Tooth and Paw 
for Custody: Whether Louisiana Courts Should Recognize Companion Animals as More than 
Property, 37 S.U. L. REV. 101 (2009); Heidi Stroh, Puppy Love: Providing for the Legal Protection 
of Animals when Their Owners Get Divorced, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 231 (2007). 
 454. See, e.g., Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing 
Pets‟ Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31 (2001); 
Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 NEB. L. REV. 
783, 784–85 (2004); Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “Non-Economic” 
Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 
7 ANIMAL L. 45 (2001). 
 455. Wilson, supra note 345, at 194. 
 456. Squires-Lee, supra note 347, at 1098–99. 
 457. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 87–88. 
 458. Id. at 88; see also Epstein, supra note 454, at 47 (emphasizing the ―length of time the pet 
has been with the owner‖). 
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decedent and a pet.
459
 Second, courts could consider the decedent‘s care of 
the pet. For example, they could assess the extent to which the decedent 
had ―fed, groomed, housed, and maintained [the pet] in a safe 
environment,‖460 regularly exercised the pet,461 and provided medical 
care.
462
 
 Third, courts could look at the ―emotional connection the owner had 
with his or her animal‖463 as another indicator of the strength of the bond 
between decedent and pet. Several authors have focused on whether a 
family-type attachment
464
 existed between owner and pet. One 
commentator has suggested that evidence of such an attachment might be 
―photos of the pet paid to be taken or snapshots displayed, extraneous 
expenditures (treats, massages, birthdays, holidays, etc.), sleep patterns 
(special bed or with owner) [, and] . . . [p]articipation in family activities: 
attending family vacations, shopping trips, or other outings.‖465 Under the 
actual relationship approach, courts would examine similar evidence in 
inheritance cases, but would not assess whether the relationship between 
the decedent and a pet was familial in nature. 
 Fourth, courts would evaluate the relationship of the pet with the 
decedent as well as the relationship of the decedent with the pet. The above 
three categories emphasized the decedent‘s treatment of the pet. Here, 
courts would look instead for evidence that the pet played a significant role 
in the decedent‘s life.466 For example, courts could consider whether the 
pet provided the decedent ―‗companionship, pleasure, fun, physical 
security and protection, physical health and service.‘‖467 In addition, courts 
could examine how the pet contributed to the decedent‘s emotional and 
psychological well-being through, for instance, ―comfort, depression 
reduction or anti-anxiety effects, or other therapeutic effects.‖468 Courts 
might give particular weight to relationships between service or therapy 
animals and decedents. Indeed, attorney Carolyn Matlock has argued that 
in such cases, courts should ―presume[] . . . the existence of a strong 
human-animal bond.‖469 
 In short, the actual relationship approach would align inheritance law 
with current societal views of family and pets. It would recognize that a 
                                                                                                                     
 459. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88; Fransheneka J. Watson, Note, Raising the Damage 
Award for the Loss of a Beloved Pet Via the Creation of a New Category: Pet as a “Non-
Functional Dependant,” 33 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 315, 324 (2008). 
 460. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88. 
 461. Stroh, supra note 453, at 236. 
 462. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88; Julian Lee, Woof, Woof: A Call for Legislative Action to 
Help Companion Animals and Those Who Care for Them, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 141, 154 (2004). 
 463. Root, supra note 345, at 447. 
 464. See, e.g., Pintar, supra note 417, at 758. 
 465. Wilson, supra note 345, at 194. 
 466. Epstein, supra note 454, at 47 (―Courts should also require testimony as to . . . examples 
of the important role the pet played in the owner‘s life . . . .‖). 
 467. Pintar, supra note 417, at 740 & n.23 (quoting a ―1999 study commissioned by three 
prominent veterinary associations‖). 
 468. Wilson, supra note 345, at 194. 
 469. MATLACK, supra note 348, at 88. 
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decedent‘s closest ties may well be with those the family paradigm 
excludes. The actual relationship approach would at long last put 
inheritance law on ―‗the evolutionary path toward laws that respect and 
uphold the value of human-animal relationships.‘‖470 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Pets of the rich and famous garner the headlines.
471
 Yet, as this Article 
has shown, Americans from all walks of life want to ensure their 
nonhuman loved ones a secure future. Billionaire Leona Helmsley,
472
 
―King of Torts‖ Melvin Belli,473 and singer Dusty Springfield474 left money 
for care of their pets. But so too did retired policeman John Renner,
475
 
railroad worker Donna Maltese,
476
 and secretary Beatrice Katz.
477
 
 At a time when more and more Americans are turning to pets for 
companionship and love, inheritance law still brands those relationships as 
―unnatural.‖ Rules governing intestacy, wills, trusts, and will substitutes 
defeat decedents‘ wishes to ensure their pets a secure future. Inheritance 
law prefers the nephew who never met his elderly, widowed aunt over the 
Siamese cat who was her ―constant companion‖ for nearly two decades.478  
The plight of decedents‘ pets exposes a larger systemic flaw—
inheritance law‘s outdated family paradigm. Under the family paradigm, 
the decedent‘s ―natural objects‖ are, by definition, the decedent‘s closest 
relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage. In 21st century America, 
however, the situation is more complex. The decedent‘s ―natural objects‖ 
are those the particular decedent valued most—survivors connected by 
affection and support rather than family status alone. Nonetheless, the 
inheritance system continues to impose its single, abstract, family-biased 
vision of ―natural‖ wealth distribution and to ignore individuals‘ actual 
                                                                                                                     
 470. Root, supra note 345, at 444 (quoting Chrisanne Beckner, Pain and Suffering: Veterinary 
Malpractice Lawsuit Challenges the Notion that Pets Are Merely Property, NEWSREVIEW.COM 
(May 31, 2001), http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/content?oid=6585). 
 471. See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Little Dog, Large Estate: Chihuahua at Center 
of Fight Over Posner Heiress‟s Will, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10  
001424052748703513604575311020555877854.html; Pooch Living Off Heiress‟ $1B, N.Y. POST, 
May 25, 2002, at 10. 
 472. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
 473. Steve Rubenstein, New Fight Over Belli‟s Scribbled Wills, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 1996, 
at A13 (reporting that in his holographic will, Belli left $10,000 to his dogs, Rhumpy, Ozzie, 
Momba, and Sky); see also Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 33, 57 n.95 (1999) (discussing Belli‘s will). 
 474. See SELTZER & BEYER, supra note 74, at 122 (discussing Springfield‘s provisions for her 
cat, Nicholas). 
 475. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 476. See Amy Sacks, When Pets Get Left Behind Facilities Can Make Sure Animals Well 
Cared for After Their Owner Dies, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 8, 2007, at 16 (reporting that railroad 
worker Donna Maltese made arrangements in her will for Thunder, her twenty-five-year-old African 
gray parrot). 
 477. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. 
 478. Michael Sangiacomo, Widow‟s Will Leaves Questions, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 19, 1999, at 
1B. 
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relationships and intent. The costs only continue to mount for all affected 
by inheritance law‘s family paradigm. 
This Article has demonstrated once again that the injustices of the 
inheritance system cannot be addressed by piecemeal reforms.
479
 
Reformers must challenge the very conceptual basis of inheritance law—
the family paradigm‘s narrow definition of ―natural objects.‖ Until 
reformers look beyond the family paradigm, Americans and their loved 
ones—both nonhuman and human—will remain ―trapped in a universe that 
no longer exists.‖480 
                                                                                                                     
 479. See supra Part III. For earlier critiques of piecemeal reforms, see Foster, Family 
Paradigm, supra note 16, at 222–40; Foster, Individualized Justice, supra note 16, at 1364–85. 
 480. WISE, supra note 343, at 9 (formatting altered). 
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